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Internationally, as well as in South Africa, legal reform aimed at increasing taxpayer information 
transparency has gained momentum over the past few years, especially in the light of the G20 led Base 
Erosion and Profit Shifting (‘BEPS’) Project. Ensuring that the fundamental rights of the taxpayer, 
guaranteed by the Constitution1, remain protected amidst the hurried implementation of these reforms is 
of paramount importance and cannot be overlooked or deferred. 
To a great extent, the question as to whether the current rules, regulations, and practices surrounding 
exchange of taxpayer information in South Africa would pass constitutional muster has, as yet, gone 
unasked and unanswered in academic literature.  
This minor dissertation seeks to identify and analyse the constitutional questions raised by these existing 
rules and practices, with special reference to the constitutional rights of taxpayers in South Africa. 
Specifically, the current framework for both the automatic exchange of information and exchange upon 
request is considered in the context of two constitutional rights, namely the right to privacy and the right 
to just administrative action, with due recognition of the general limitation of rights provided for in the 
Constitution. 
Importantly, this paper does not dispute the need for exchange of taxpayer information in principle, nor 
the desirability of effective tax administration. It is furthermore appreciated and acknowledged that a 
balance must be struck between the often competing interests of the South African Revenue Service 
(‘SARS’) as an administrator seeking to discharge its mandate in the most efficient manner possible, and 
the fundamental rights of the taxpayer.  
The key finding arising from the research presented in this minor dissertation is that the constitutional 
rights of privacy and just administrative action of taxpayers enjoy limited and often no protection during 
the exchange of information process in South Africa.  This is due to an underdeveloped legal framework 
and the current practices of the SARS that do not always respect the constitutional framework in the 
exchange of information process. 
Although the SARS is enabled by legislation to exchange taxpayer information in accordance with South 
Africa’s tax treaty obligations, the manner in which this is done and the protection afforded to the 
taxpayer during the exchange process is a separate matter. The SARS, in its actions, from whatever source 
it derives its authority, must stay within the bounds of the playing field as determined by the Constitution.  
Following the analysis of the current protection afforded to taxpayers, as described above, this 
dissertation finally endeavors to provide recommendations where deficiencies in the current exchange of 
information framework are identified - be it through amendments to legislation or the conduct of the 
SARS in practice. 
                                                             
1 Any reference in this document to “the Constitution” (or similar reference) refers to the Constitution of the Republic 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background and objectives of this paper 
To a great extent, the question as to whether the current rules, regulations, and practices surrounding 
exchange of taxpayer information in South Africa would pass constitutional2 muster has, as yet, gone 
unasked and unanswered in academic literature.  
The South African government has repeatedly expressed and demonstrated its commitment to advancing 
the movement for greater transparency in the international tax arena – specifically in promoting the 
exchange of taxpayer information. This position was affirmed in the first interim report on base erosion 
and profit shifting (‘BEPS’) released by the Davis Tax Committee for public comment.  3 The “[c]ompliant” 
rating assigned to South Africa in the combined first and second phase Global Forum Peer Reviews is 
indicative of South Africa’s endeavours to ensure compliance with international best practice. 4 South 
Africa’s ever expanding network of tax treaties containing exchange of information mechanisms covers 
more than 90 jurisdictions. 5 
In South Africa, tax treaties are domesticated and become part of domestic tax legislation. In terms of this 
legislation, the competent authority, as part of the South African Revenue Service (‘SARS’), enjoys broad 
authority and is granted extensive investigative powers. This includes the authority to gather information 
for the purpose sharing it with other States’ competent authorities (in accordance with South Africa’s treaty 
obligations). 
Although the SARS has been afforded these powers by the relevant enabling legislation and is allowed a 
certain degree of discretion in the manner in which it conducts itself, all these powers remain subservient 
to the Constitution - which means that “any law or conduct that is not in accordance with the Constitution, 
either for procedural or substantive reasons, will … not have the force of law”. 6 The SARS, in its actions, from 
whatever source it derives its authority, must stay within the bounds of the playing field as determined by 
the Constitution. 
                                                             
2 Any reference in this document to “the Constitution” (or similar reference) refers to the Constitution of the Republic 
of South Africa, 1996, including the Bill of Rights contained therein. 
3 The Davis Tax Committee was called into being in 2013 by the then Minister of Finance and charged with 
“assess[ing][South Africa’s] tax policy framework and its role in supporting the objectives of inclusive growth, 
employment, development and fiscal sustainability” – which includes evaluating the South African tax regime in the 
light of base erosion and profit shifting.  
4 Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes Peer Reviews: South Africa 2013: 
Combined: Phase 1 +Phase 2, incorporating Phase 2 ratings, OECD Publishing, November 2013, p. 8, [cited 2016 Feb 
14] available online from <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264205901-en>. 
5 Ibid, p. 9. 




The cornerstone of the Constitution is the Bill of Rights, which enshrines the rights of all people in South 
Africa (both natural, and corporate), and applies also to persons who are not citizens. As such, the Bill of 
Rights is “the principal source of substantive constraints on public power”.7  
The aim of this paper is to analyse, in light of existing South African constitutional law, both automatic 
exchange of information (‘EoIA’) and exchange upon request (‘EoIR’) in the context of two fundamental 
rights (as expressed in the Bill of Rights), namely the right to privacy8 and the right to just administrative 
action. 9 
In South Africa, constitutional rights and freedoms are not absolute. 10 The Bill of Rights includes a general 
limitation provision by virtue of which any fundamental right may be restricted. Critically, however, this 
infringement may only be made in terms of law of general application to the extent that the limitation is 
“reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality, and freedom, 
taking into account all relevant factors”. 11  
The hurdle that must be cleared before lawfully limiting any of the fundamental rights is meant to be a high 
one.  
The analysis will therefore also consider the questions raised by the limitation of rights clause in the context 
of the taxpayer’s right to privacy and just administrative action in the exchange of information (‘EoI’) 
process.   
Internationally, as well as domestically in South Africa, projects aimed at increasing transparency in tax 
matters have gained momentum over the past few years, especially in the light of the G20 led BEPS project. 
Ensuring that the constitutionally guaranteed rights of the taxpayer remain protected amidst the hurried 
implementation of these reforms is of paramount importance and cannot be overlooked or deferred.  
This paper hopes to take an initial step in identifying and analysing the constitutional questions South 
Africa currently faces in light of its existing treaty obligations to exchange taxpayer information. Where it 
is found that there are shortcomings in the manner or extent to which the taxpayer’s right to privacy and 
just administrative action have been effected (either in legislation or in the conduct of the SARS in practice), 




                                                             
7 Ibid, p. 23. 
8 Section 14 of the Constitution. 
9 Section 33 of the Constitution. 
10 Currie and De Waal, p. 150. 




1.2 Research question and scope 
This dissertation aims to identify and analyse the South African constitutional aspects raised by the 
protection currently afforded to taxpayers during the EoI process. The analysis will be confined to the 
protection of the taxpayer’s fundamental rights to privacy and just administrative action.  
1.3 Research method 
In this paper, the research question is addressed and a conclusion is reached through an analysis of the 
relevant primary legislation, specifically the South African Constitution, the Income Tax Act No. 58 of 
1962, the Tax Administration Act No. 28 of 2011, the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act No. 3 of 
2001, the Protection of Personal Information Act No. 3 of 2013, as well as South African case law and the 
relevant statutory provisions. The analysis also draws on selected secondary sources, including foreign 
case law, EU law, various OECD12 publications and model treaties and their commentaries, and 
publications by various South African and international researchers. 
1.4 Structure of this paper 
Chapter 2 of this paper sets out the current EoI landscape in South Africa, including the legal basis for EoI, 
as well as the protection currently afforded to taxpayers in practice. 
Because the fundamental rights set out in the Bill of Rights are not absolute, but are subject to the general 
limitation provisions of section 36 of the Constitution, Chapter 3 provides further analysis of the 
limitation provision and its interaction with the rights contained in the Bill of Rights. 
Following the introductory chapters, this paper is divided into two main chapters, namely Chapter 4: The 
Right to Privacy and Chapter 5: The Right to Just Administrative Action. 
In both these chapters a short introduction is provided of the relevant fundamental right and the key 
principles established therein, including references to relevant pieces of enabling legislation and relevant 
case law. These principles are then applied to the current protection afforded to taxpayers in the EoI 
process in general – i.e. from the basic starting point that the SARS is distributing taxpayer information to 
foreign competent authorities. Questions raised as part of this analysis would apply to both EoIR and 
EoIA. Following this broad analysis, certain questions raised that are unique to either EoIA or EoIR will be 
addressed separately at the end of each chapter, where relevant. 
The final chapter sets out conclusions drawn from the analysis in the preceding chapters as well as a 
number of recommendations to address the identified shortcomings.  
 
 
                                                             




CHAPTER 2: EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION IN SOUTH AFRICA AND THE PROTECTION CURRENTLY 
AFFORDED TO TAXPAYERS IN PRACTICE 
2.1 EoI in South Africa: the legal basis for the cross-border exchange of taxpayer information 
2.1.1 General comments 
South Africa has signed and ratified a number of multilateral and bilateral agreements containing EoI 
mechanisms, including the Convention on Multilateral Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters and 
Amending Protocol. 13  
In terms of bilateral agreements, most of South Africa’s double tax treaties currently in force (currently 
over 90) contain some form of EoI article, 14 with 13 tax information exchange agreements (‘TIEA’) 
currently in force. 15  
Section 231 of the Constitution, read with section 108 if the Income Tax Act16 (‘ITA’) provides that once a 
treaty entered into by the National Executive is approved by Parliament and published in the Government 
Gazette, the provisions of said treaty will have the same effect as if they were enacted in terms of the ITA. 
In other words, the provisions of the treaties are placed on level footing with domestic law. 17 
The majority of South Africa’s treaties containing an EoI mechanism include wording similar to that of the 
OECD Model treaty. Depending on the age of the treaty (and the version of the OECD Model it is therefore 
based on), the treaty will enable the SARS to share taxpayer information with the competent authority of 
the treaty partner that is either ‘necessary’ (pre-2005 OECD Model treaties) or ‘foreseeably relevant’ for 
carrying out the provisions of the treaty or of the domestic laws of the two States. 
The EoI clauses contained in the international agreements mentioned above form the legal basis for both 
EoIR and EoIA (with the exception of the TIEAs – which cater only for EoIR). Please refer to the section 
that follows for further detail regarding the specific mechanisms in place enabling EoIA, including 
‘FATCA’, and the OECD EoIA instruments. 
In South Africa, chapter 5 of the Tax Administration Act18 (‘TAA’) provides the SARS with far-reaching 
information gathering powers. The TAA also makes specific provision for EoI in pursuance of South 
Africa’s treaty obligations in section 3(3): 
                                                             
13 According to the OECD’s records, South Africa submitted its instruments of ratification on 21 November 2013, with 
the treaty entering into force on 1 March 2014. 
14 Roeleveld, J. and West, C., “South Africa”, in: International Fiscal Association, 2013 Copenhagen Congress, Cahiers 
De Droit Fiscal International, “Exchange of Information and Cross-Border Cooperation between Tax Authorities”, 
Volume 98b, p. 687. 
15 SARS, [cited 2016 Feb 14] available online from < http://www.sars.gov.za/Legal/International-Treaties-
Agreements/Pages/Document-Results.aspx>. 
16 Income Tax Act No. 58 of 1962. 
17 Roeleveld and West, p. 687. 




“(3) If SARS, in accordance with an international agreement –  
(a) received a request for, is obliged to exchange or wishes to spontaneously exchange information, 
SARS may disclose or obtain the information for transmission to the competent authority of the 
other country as if it were relevant material required for purposes of a tax Act and must treat the 
information obtained as taxpayer information.” 
The SARS is therefore in principle empowered, by law, to gather, and then exchange taxpayer information 
internationally. The manner in which it does so, and how the taxpayers’ rights are protected in this 
process is, however, a separate matter entirely. 
2.1.2 Specific considerations surrounding the legal basis for EoIA in South Africa 
A brief background to the implementation of the United States (‘US’) Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act 
(‘FATCA’) and the OECD’s EoIA model instrument is provided below. 
To implement the FATCA reporting framework in South Africa, the South African and US governments 
have entered into an inter-governmental agreement (‘IGA’). This IGA (as an ‘international agreement’ per 
the TAA) would require South African financial institutions to report specified information surrounding 
the accounts held by so-called ‘specified US persons’ or passive entities controlled by ‘specified US 
persons’ to the SARS on an annual basis. This information is then shared with the US by the SARS in 
accordance with Article 26 of the 1997 SA-US double tax treaty. 19  
The IGA entered into force in South Africa on 28 October 2014. The affected South African financial 
institutions were required to report the necessary financial information on its US account holders to the 
SARS in June 2015, with the SARS exchanging the information with the US Treasury by September 2015. 
South Africa is also a so-called ‘early adopter’ of the OECD’s EoIA Model instrument.  
The OECD’s EoIA Model instrument consists of a Competent Authority Agreement (‘CAA’) and Common 
Reporting Standard (‘CRS’), collectively referred to in this paper as the ‘OECD Standard’.  The OECD 
Standard requires the bulk automatic exchange of taxpayer information between the signatories of the 
agreements.  
This instrument is largely based on the FATCA IGA entered into between South Africa and the US and, 
accordingly, entails similar reporting requirements on the part of South African financial institutions and 
the SARS.  
In order to identify accounts that should be reported to the SARS under either FATCA or the OECD 
Standard, financial institutions must carry out certain due diligence procedures to detect reportable 
accounts. These procedures would include a search of electronic records for the presence of at least one 
                                                             
19 The SA-US IGA is based on the Model 1 agreement. The Model 2 agreement, which would see the direct exchange of 




of a list of predefined indicia. The presence of one of the indicia would then serve as an indication that the 
account holder is a tax resident of another country. For example, these markers include instances where 
the account holder has a telephone number in the other State, and no telephone number in South Africa, 
and where the account holder has a mailing or residential address in the other State. The EoIA 
instruments do not provide for any tie-breaker test: the information must be shared with each 
jurisdiction for which an indicium has been identified.  
As is the case with the FATCA IGA, the legal basis for exchange remains the EoI clause in the applicable 
double tax treaty (or the Convention on Multilateral Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters). A key 
difference between the FATCA IGA entered into with the US and the OECD Standard, however, is that the 
CRS provides for reciprocal exchange whereas the FATCA IGA entails a one-directional flow of 
information to the US. 20 
In 2015, South Africa, in accordance with its commitments as an ‘early adopter’ of the OECD Standard, 
proposed and later enacted amendments to the TAA that enable and require South African financial 
institutions to report the necessary information in the prescribed form to the SARS for cross-border 
exchange, 21 with the first exchange taking place in 2017. The financial institutions will be required to 
report information on all account holders irrespective of whether the country that the indicium points to 
is a treaty partner of South Africa or not. 22 The SARS will then collate the information received from the 
financial institution and transmit the data to those countries with which the necessary treaties and 
agreements are in place.23 
In South Africa, the SARS, as well as National Treasury, have expressed their support of the movement 
towards greater tax transparency and the view that EoIA is an indispensable tool in achieving this. As 
stated in a briefing note addressing the adoption and implementation of the OECD Standard in South 
Africa released by the SARS24, and echoed in the Explanatory Memorandum to the 2015 Tax 
Administration Laws Amendment Bill: 25  
                                                             
20 During the International Fiscal Association (‘IFA’) 2015 Basel Congress, it was indicated that US domestic law will 
not allow for the US to participate in the automatic exchange of taxpayer information on a reciprocal basis. However, 
on 2 October 2015, the IRS released a statement (see IR-2015-111) in which it announced that the information 
exchange with certain, unspecified nations, will now be on a reciprocal basis. It is not clear whether South Africa is 
included in this group. 
21 Tax Administration Law Amendment Act No. 23 of 2015. 
22 Memorandum on the Objects of the Tax Administration Laws Amendment Bill, 2015, par. 2.33, [cited 2016 Feb 14] 
available online from < http://www.sars.gov.za/AllDocs/LegalDoclib/ExplMemo/LAPD-LPrep-EM-2015-02%20-
%20Memorandum%20on%20the%20objects%20of%20TALA%20Bill%20of%20%202015.pdf>. 
23 “Automatic exchange of information, what it is, how it works, benefits, what remains to be done”, OECD, 2012, p. 9, 
[cite 2016 Feb 16] available online from < http://www.oecd.org/tax/exchange-of-tax-
information/automaticexchangeofinformationreport.htm>. 
24 SARS, Briefing Note: Implementing the Common Reporting Standard in South Africa in terms of Regulations under 
The Tax Administration Act, 2011, [cited 2016 Feb 14] available online from < 
http://www.sars.gov.za/AllDocs/LegalDoclib/Drafts/LAPD-LPrep-Draft-2015-62%20-
%20Briefing%20Note%20on%20Common%20reporting%20standard%20TAA.pdf>. 
25 Memorandum on the Objects of the Tax Administration Laws Amendment Bill, 2015, par. 2.33, [cited 2016 Feb 14] 





“Greater transparency and the automatic exchange of information between tax administrations is 
an important step forward in countering cross border tax evasion, aggressive tax avoidance and 
base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) through, for example, transfer pricing arrangements”.  
2.2 The current protection afforded to taxpayers during the EoIR and EoIA process in practice  
In terms of EoIR, it is not the SARS’ practice to notify the relevant taxpayer upon receiving an information 
exchange request from another State. Taxpayers are not afforded the opportunity to make any 
representations during the exchange process, nor are they informed of the exchange after the fact. 
Similarly, under FATCA (EoIA), the affected persons whose private financial information is transferred by 
the financial institutions to the SARS, and then on-sent to the US, are not informed of either transfer (not 
beforehand, nor after the fact), nor are they given the opportunity to object or make representations prior 
to the exchange. 
Although not yet effective, it is expected that the rights afforded to taxpayers in practice under the OECD 
Standard in South Africa will be substantially similar to those under the FATCA IGA regime. 
The EoI clauses of the various tax treaties also afford the taxpayer some protection. For example, the 
information to be exchanged is limited to that ‘necessary’ or ‘foreseeably relevant’ to the enforcement of 
the contracting States’ tax laws. The treaties would also typically contain provisions dealing with the 
confidentiality of the information exchanged. These measures are discussed in further detail in the 







CHAPTER 3: LIMITATION OF RIGHTS 
Section 36 of the Constitution 
“(1) The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general application to the 
extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on 
human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including –  
(a) the nature of the right; 
(b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; 
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation; 
(d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and  
(e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose. 
(2) Except as provide in subsection (1) or in any other provision of the Constitution, no law may 
limit any right entrenched in the Bill of Rights”. [Emphasis added] 
3.1  Introduction 
The rights afforded to the taxpayer in the Bill of Rights are not absolute and are subject to the general 
limitation of rights provisions of section 36 of the Constitution. Consequently, should any of the 
taxpayer’s rights be restricted, the restriction will only be constitutional if the hurdles set in place by 
section 36 are cleared.  
An analysis into the constitutional questions raised by the current rules and practices surrounding the 
protection of taxpayer rights in the EoI process in South Africa can therefore not merely address sections 
14 (the right to privacy) and 33 (the right to just administrative action) of the Constitution in isolation, 
but should also extend to the questions raised by the general limitation provision. 
Before proceeding with a discussion of the fundamental rights to privacy and just administrative action, 
this chapter considers the requirements that must be met before a limitation of the taxpayer’s rights can 
be determined to be lawful. 
A look into the workings of the provisions of section 36, in the context of EoI, will be broken down into 
the following components: 
- What is meant by a ‘law of general application? 






3.2 The general limitation provision in the context of the protection of taxpayer rights in EoI 
3.2.1 The limitation of rights in terms of a ‘law of general application’ 
In order for a limitation of any of the taxpayer’s fundamental rights to be considered to be constitutional, 
that limitation must have been done in accordance with a law of general application. 
It would appear as though the term ‘law’ would include all forms of legislation (delegated or original), as 
well as common law and customary law. 26 Importantly, however, the public policy or practice of an 
organ of State, such as the SARS, will not qualify as ‘law’.27 Also, administrative action taken under the 
authority of law does not in itself qualify as a law of general application. 28 
The ‘law’ must also be general in its application. That is to say, it must apply equally to all, impersonally, 
and must be clear, accessible, and precise enough to allow all those affected to understand their rights 
and obligations. The ‘law of general application’ requirement therefore guards against arbitrary action 
against individuals or groups. Ackerman J in the S v Makwanyane case held that: “Without such a rational 
justifying mechanism, unequal treatment must follow”. 29 
An empowering provision will not be considered to be of ‘general application’ if it merely grants an 
administrator wide discretionary powers.30 Legislation conferring discretionary powers on 
administrative officials (such as the SARS) must also include constraints and guidelines on the proper 
exercise of this power. 31 In the Dawood case (in the context of the broad discretionary powers afforded 
to immigration officials by the Aliens Control Act 96 of 1991), the court ruled as follows: 32 
“It is an important principle of the rule of law that rules be sated in a clear ad accessible manner. It 
is because of this principle that section 36 requires that limitations of rights may be justifiable only 
if they are authorized by a law of general application. Moreover, if broad discretionary powers 
contain no express constraints, those who are affected by the exercise of the broad dictionary 
powers will not know what is relevant to the exercise of those powers or in what circumstances they 
are entitled to seek relief from an adverse decision. In the absence of any clear statement to that 
effect in the legislation, it would not be obvious to a potential applicant that the exercise of the 
discretion conferred upon the immigration officials … by [the Aliens Control Act] is constrained by 
the provisions of the Bill of Rights, and in particular, what factors are relevant to the decision to 
refuse to grant or extend a temporary permit. If rights are to be infringed without redress, the very 
purposes of the Constitution are defeated.”  
                                                             
26 Currie and De Waal, p. 156. 
27 See Hoffmann v South African Airways 2001 (1) SA 1 (CC), para. 41. 
28 Currie and De Waal, p. 161. 
29 S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC), para. 156. 
30 Currie and De Waal, p. 161.  
31 Ibid. 




In order for a limitation of a person’s fundamental rights to be in accordance with a law of general 
application, it cannot, therefore, be left simply to the administrative official to decide, without constraint, 
when and under what circumstances it would be justifiable to restrict that person’s rights. 
3.2.2 The ‘reasonable and justifiable’ limitation of rights 
In essence, the requirement for a limitation to be reasonable and justifiable seeks to ensure that any law 
that restricts a fundamental right does so for reasons that would be acceptable in a free and fair 
democratic society. There must be a balance between the harm done by the restriction, and the benefits it 
is designed to achieve. This requirement for balance, or proportionality, was addressed in the S v 
Makwanyane case: 33 
“The limitation of constitutional rights for a purpose that is reasonable and necessary in a 
democratic society involves the weighing up of competing values, and ultimately an assessment 
based on proportionality.”  
Section 36 includes a list of relevant factors that must be taken into account when determining whether 
the limitation was ‘reasonable and justifiable’ (i.e. whether there is a balance between the competing 
interests). 
They are: 34 
a) The nature of the right. 
Not all fundamental rights are equal – some weigh more heavily than others.  
b) The importance of the limitation. 
In order for the limitation to be justifiable, it must serve a purpose that reasonable citizens will find 
compellingly important. 
c) The nature and extent of the limitation. 
The restriction of rights should not be more extensive than is warranted by the purpose that it seeks to 
achieve. 35 
d) The relation between the limitation and its purpose. 
There must be a causal link between the law, which restricts the rights, and the purpose it was designed 
to achieve. Importantly, unless this link is self-evident, appropriate evidence (such as statistical data) 
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must be presented to support the connection. A court cannot determine whether the limitation is 
reasonable or justifiable in the abstract. 36 
e) Less restrictive means to achieve the purpose. 
The law should not restrict a fundamental right more than is necessary to achieve its purpose. Therefore, 
if there is a less restrictive but equally effective measure available, that more balanced, or proportional 
approach will be preferred. 
3.2.3 The lawful limitation of rights in the context of EoI 
Any limitation of the taxpayer’s rights during the EoI process will only be lawful should the criteria set 
out in section 36 of the Constitution be met. 
The questions raised by the by the interaction between the limitation criteria and the right to privacy, and 
just administrative action in the context of EoI are analysed in further detail in Chapters 4 and 5, 
respectively.  
3.3 Summary remarks 
Critically, when determining whether the limitation of a person’s fundamental rights is reasonable and 
justified (and therefore lawful) it must be understood that the hurdles put in place by section 36 for the 
lawful limitation of fundamental rights are necessarily high.  
As perhaps best captured by Currie and De Waal: 37 
“It must be emphasized that the existence of a general limitation section does not mean that the 
rights in the Bill of Rights can be limited for any reason. It is not simply a question of determining 
whether the benefits outweigh the cost to the right-holder. If the rights can be overridden simply on 
the basis that the general welfare will be served by the restriction then there is little purpose in the 
constitutional entrenchment of rights. The reasons for limiting a right need to be exceptionally 
strong. The South African Constitution permits the limitation of rights by law but requires the 
limitation to be justifiable. This means that the limitation must meet a purpose that most people 
would regard as compellingly important. But, however important the purpose of the limitation, 
restrictions on rights will not be justifiable unless there is good reason for thinking that the 
restriction would achieve that purpose it is designed to achieve, and that there is no other 
‘realistically available’ way in which the purpose can be achieved without restricting right”.   
In the chapters that follow, the taxpayer’s rights to privacy and just administrative action in the EoI 
process are analysed in light of this general limitation clause. 
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CHAPTER 4: THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY 
Section 14 of the Constitution 
“(1) Everyone has the right to privacy, which includes the right not to have –  
a) their person or home searched; 
b) their property searched; 
c) their possessions seized; or 
d) the privacy of their communications infringed.” 
4.1 Introduction  
Section 14 of the Constitution guarantees the right to privacy. The section contains two parts, namely a 
general right to privacy, and a specific list of prohibited infringements. Note that that the specific list of 
infringements forms part of the general right to privacy and does not limit or confine the general right to 
privacy to these specific examples.38 
In the context of taxation, the constitutional right to privacy is currently given effect to primarily in the 
TAA. In the context of EoI, the relevant international agreements themselves also contain provisions 
speaking to the confidentiality of the information exchanged. The questions raised by the protection 
afforded to taxpayers in practice, when viewed in the light of the provisions of section 14 of the 
Constitution (as given effect to in the TAA and international agreements), will be analyzed in further 
detail in the sections that follow. 
Further to this, in 2013, Parliament enacted legislation specifically aimed at giving effect to the 
constitutionally guaranteed right to privacy, namely the Protection of Personal Information (‘POPI’) Act.39 
Although most sections of the POPI Act are not yet effective, 40 its provisions do raise a number of 
questions regarding EoI and the protection currently enjoyed by taxpayers in South Africa – questions 
that will become of great relevance once the provisions of the POPI Act become effective. The details of 
this piece of legislation and its interaction with EoI is therefore discussed in further detail in a separate 
section to this Chapter. 
In terms of the taxpayers’ right to privacy, a useful starting point to the analysis would be a comparison of 
the protection afforded to taxpayers and their private information within the borders of the Republic (i.e. 
in a purely domestic context), with the protection enjoyed once the information crosses the country’s 
borders. Should there be any differences, the analysis will consider whether this amounts to a limitation 
of the taxpayer’s rights, and whether this limitation could be said to be ‘reasonable and justifiable’ and in 
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terms of ‘a law of general application’. The comparison is based on the assumption that exchange of 
taxpayer information in a purely domestic setting meets with constitutional principles. It is beyond the 
scope of this paper to investigate the validity of this assumption, although it may be self-evident from the 
analysis that will follow.  
4.2 The taxpayer’s constitutional right to privacy in a domestic context, as given effect to by the 
TAA and international agreements 
4.2.1 The taxpayer’s right to privacy in a domestic context 
4.2.1.1 The limitation of the taxpayer’s right to privacy when disclosing information to the SARS 
In South Africa, the taxpayer is obliged, by law, to submit an income tax return to the Commissioner. 
Given the very nature of income tax (a tax not purely based on some external manifestation of the 
taxpayer’s wealth, such as land ownership or social class), this return will necessarily contain certain 
personal details of the taxpayer; details that he or she would arguably not voluntarily disclose, if given the 
choice.  
By requiring taxpayers to disclose this information to the SARS, their right to privacy is infringed. 41 
In order to determine whether this infringement is lawful, the question therefore becomes whether this 
breach is justified and reasonable in a fair and open democratic society (as is required by section 36 of 
the Constitution). 
The State is obliged to provide its citizens with certain services; services which are funded by taxes 
collected. In order for the SARS to carry out its mandate as the nation’s revenue collections agency, it 
requires access to certain personal details of the taxpayer to ensure that the amount of income tax 
lawfully due has been paid. There is arguably no less intrusive way to do this other than to require the 
taxpayer to disclose certain facts to the SARS and to grant the SARS investigative powers where there is a 
concern that the information provided by the taxpayer is inaccurate or incomplete. 
Moreover, once the SARS receives this private information from the taxpayer, it is subject to strict secrecy 
provisions. Chapter 6 of the TAA obliges the SARS to maintain the confidentiality of the taxpayer 
information with which it has been supplied.  
This duty imposed on the SARS to preserve the secrecy of taxpayer information is a significant factor in 
ensuring that the limitation of the taxpayer’s right to privacy is not excessive, bringing a sense of 
proportionality to the violation.  
It is therefore commonly accepted, internationally, that it is a reasonable and justifiable limitation of the 
taxpayer’s right to privacy (and, accordingly, is lawful in a South African context). 
                                                             




4.2.1.2 The protection currently afforded to taxpayers in South Africa in terms of their right to 
privacy 
As mentioned previously, a key contributing factor to the reasonableness of the intrusion on the 
taxpayer’s right to privacy is the strict secrecy provisions that the SARS must adhere to in respect of the 
information supplied by the taxpayer.  
Any erosion of this duty and obligation on the part of the SARS would be counterproductive to its core 
function as tax collector. Croome summarizes this principle as follows: 42 
“The underlying rationale of the secrecy provision in the Income Tax Act is to encourage taxpayers 
to make full and proper disclosure of their income to the Commissioner. The thinking is that the 
taxpayers would be uncomfortable about making full and proper disclosure of their personal 
financial affairs to the Commissioner if they knew that such information could readily be made 
available to third parties without good reason.”  
This view is in line with the judgement by Feetham JP in the Silver v Silver case: 43 
“For the purpose of the administration of the Income Tax Act, it is necessary that the fullest 
information should be available to the Department of Inland Revenue. If that information is to be 
obtained, there must be some guarantee as to the secrecy.”  
This obligation under the TAA to maintain the confidentiality of taxpayer information is, however, subject 
to certain limitations and exceptions. 
‘Taxpayer information’ is widely defined in the TAA as being any information provided by a taxpayer or 
information obtained by SARS in respect of the taxpayer, including biometric information. 44 
The Commissioner is allowed, expressly by chapter 6 of the TAA, to disclose certain taxpayer information 
to specified third parties, such as the Statistician-General, the Governor of the South African Reserve 
Bank, and the Financial Services Board. 45 
The Commissioner may also disclose the confidential taxpayer information in his possession to the South 
African Police Service and National Prosecuting Agency (‘NPA’) if such information relates to a tax 
offence. 46 
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A ‘tax offence’ is defined as: 47 
“an offence in terms of a tax Act or any other offence involving –  
a) fraud on SARS or on a SARS official to the administration of a tax Act; or 
b) theft of moneys due or paid to SARS for the benefit of the National Revenue Fund.” 
A ‘tax Act’, as defined, includes only South African tax legislation. 
In other cases, i.e. those not relating to South African tax offences (including other criminal matters), such 
a disclosure may only be made provided that an order to do so has been granted by a judge in chambers 
following an ex parte application. 48 
It remains difficult to balance the needs of the State in administering its tax laws, and the taxpayer’s right 
to privacy. However, the fact that the approval of a judge in chambers is required before any confidential 
taxpayer information is disclosed to the NPA (in cases other than those involving South African tax 
offences) forms a significant component to the equilibrium struck between these competing interests. 
The judicial oversight places restraints on the SARS’ authority and discretion in how it deals with 
taxpayer information, providing a degree of certainty to the taxpayer that the information shared with the 
SARS will not be arbitrarily disclosed to third parties within South Africa, based solely on the discretion of 
an administrative official.  
In essence, the rules and regulations surrounding the safeguarding of taxpayer confidential information 
within the borders of South Africa, as spelled out in chapter 6 of the TAA, ensure that the authority and 
discretion afforded to the SARS are appropriately reigned in, and the violation of the taxpayer’s rights are 
reasonable, and not excessive. 
4.2.2 The taxpayer’s right to privacy in South Africa in the context of EoI 
4.2.2.1 The exchange of taxpayer information by the SARS and the TAA secrecy rules 
Section 108 of the ITA read with section 231 of the Constitution authorizes the Executive to enter into 
treaties for the avoidance of double taxation with foreign governments. Once these agreements have been 
approved by Parliament and published in the Gazette they have the same effect as if they were enacted in 
the ITA. 
Specifically, section 108(5) of the ITA provides for the relaxing of the secrecy provisions surrounding 
taxpayer information in the context of South Africa’s obligations per its treaty network:49 
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“The duty imposed by any law to preserve secrecy with regards to such tax shall not prevent the 
disclosure to any authorized officer of the… [other contracting State], of the facts, knowledge of 
which is necessary to enable it to be determined whether immunity, exemption or relief ought to be 
given or which it is necessary to disclose in order to render or receive assistance in accordance with 
the [treaty]”. 
It is interesting to note that the wording of this particular provision of the ITA has not changed 
significantly over the past 40 years (with the coming into force of the 1996 Constitution having no 
effect).50  
Section 69(2)(b) of the TAA allows for the confidentiality provisions contained in chapter 6 of the TAA to 
be overridden by the provisions of other Acts (such as section 108(5) of the ITA). 
Depending on the wording of the relevant treaty, the secrecy provisions of the TAA would therefore not 
prevent the SARS from exchanging tax information with its treaty partner where that information is 
‘necessary’ or ‘foreseeably relevant’ for carrying out the provisions of the treaty or the domestic laws of 
either of the two States. 
Importantly, although section 108(5) of the ITA would not permit the exchange of information to be 
refused solely on the basis of any domestic secrecy provision (such as bank secrecy rules and regulations) 
it should be borne in mind that the ITA cannot go so far as to unjustly or unreasonably limit the 
constitutional rights of the taxpayer. In other words, section 108(5) does not absolve the SARS from its 
duty to operate within the bounds of the Constitution.  
As stated previously, although the SARS is empowered by law to exchange taxpayer information, it 
remains bound by the Constitution in the manner in which it does so and the protection afforded to 
taxpayers during the process. 
4.2.2.2 In the context of their right to privacy, the protection currently afforded to taxpayers in 
South Africa in the EoI process 
Tax treaties typically include wording that requires the contracting State receiving the information to 
ensure that the information received is treated in the same manner as information obtained under its 
own domestic legislation would be. In other words the secrecy provisions of the receiving State will apply, 
as opposed to those of the State supplying the information. 
What procedures the SARS would perform to confirm the scope of the secrecy provisions of the receiving 
State, or the degree of confidentiality that the information will be afforded, in practice, is not clear. No 
information is publically available to provide insight as to whether at all, or to what extent, the protection 
afforded by the receiving State is compared or weighed against the protection afforded under South 
                                                             




African law during the treaty negotiation process, nor is it known with any certainty whether the 
appraisal is performed before the information is later shared. There is currently no provision in the ITA 
or TAA that would oblige the SARS to carry out any such procedures before sharing the information. 51 
The OECD Peer Review report on South Africa merely states that “[w]hen a request is forwarded to a local 
revenue office, the confidentiality of the information is emphasized to ensure maximum awareness of the 
issue”. 52 
As stated previously in Chapter 2, currently in South Africa, the ITA and TAA in effect places the decision 
to share taxpayer information purely at the discretion of the SARS.  
The legal protection that must be afforded to taxpayers or the specific procedures that must be adhered 
to by the SARS in the disclosure of taxpayer information to foreign governments is not specifically dealt 
with in the TAA. Other possible exceptions (in a purely domestic setting) to the strict secrecy rules are 
spelled out in the TAA.  No further specific rules or checks and balances are expressed in the TAA to 
constrain the SARS’ discretion in this regard. For example, no further guidance or restrictions are placed 
on the SARS when determining whether the information to be exchanged is ‘necessary’ or ‘foreseeably 
relevant’ for the enforcement of the contracting States’ tax laws. 
It would appear, therefore, as though the protection afforded to taxpayers in South Africa in relation to 
exchanges with foreign revenue authorities is similar (but not identical) to that afforded to taxpayers 
when the SARS shares information with the NPA relating to domestic tax offences. In other words, the 
disclosure is made at the sole discretion of the SARS, with no need to obtain a ruling from a judge in 
chambers beforehand. These two instances are, however, clearly not comparable: the one (the sharing of 
information with the NPA) deals with criminality, and the other with investigation only. 
It should be noted that specific rules and regulations are in place in the TAA surrounding the sharing of 
taxpayer information with the NPA. Section 43 of the TAA provides that before a criminal investigation 
can be pursued, the matter must first be referred to a senior SARS official who must make the final 
decision whether this course of action would be warranted. This oversight by a senior SARS official is not 
currently required by either the TAA or ITA in the EoI process. 
It must be borne in mind that from a constitutional perspective, as discussed in Chapter 3, in order for a 
restriction of a person’s fundamental rights to be lawful, that limitation must have been done in 
accordance with a ‘law of general application’ (as required by section 36 of the Constitution). This will not 
be the case when the rights in question are limited in terms of an enabling provision granting an 
administrator wide, unconstrained discretionary powers. Should the taxpayer’s right to privacy be 
limited or restricted during the EoI process, the question arises whether the discretion afforded to the 
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SARS in determining when and how information is to be shared with the foreign country’s competent 
authority is so broad and unconstrained by the TAA and ITA that it falls beyond the legal norm (i.e. a 
limitation ‘in terms of a law of general application’).  Should this the case, the limitation would not be 
lawful. 
4.3 The relaxation of the secrecy rules and the erosion of the reasonableness and proportionality 
of the violation of the taxpayer’s right to privacy 
As discussed previously, when taxpayers are obliged to disclose their private information to the SARS by 
way of assessment, their right to privacy is violated. This limitation, is, however, done in terms of a law of 
general application (namely the TAA), and is accepted to be reasonable and justifiable. The infringement 
of the taxpayer’s right is therefore not unconstitutional. 
The obligation on the part of the SARS to treat any taxpayer information it receives as strictly confidential 
(as per the secrecy provisions of chapter 6 of the TAA) is one measure that ensures that the violation of 
the taxpayer’s right is not excessive – i.e. that there is proportionality between the harm done, and the 
purpose it sought to achieve. 
The question therefore arises whether the current lack of protection afforded to taxpayers in the EoI 
process could be said to erode this proportionality to the point where the hurdles put in place by section 
36 of the Constitution, namely the ‘reasonable’ and ‘justifiable’ criterion, are no longer cleared.  
The question is complex, and one would be confronted with various arguments leaning one way or the 
other. For example, one would first have to agree on the weight this guarantee of confidentiality carries in 
the proportionality equation. Then it would have to be considered whether the confidentiality guarantee 
is at all affected by the transfer of the information, and if so, to what extent (given the confidentiality 
requirements included in the tax treaties).   
In the context of the right to privacy, it can be argued that it would be fair for the protection afforded to 
taxpayers during the sharing of information with foreign governments to be on par with those 
surrounding information sharing during domestic investigations into tax offences.  
The arguments in favour of this view would include the fact that, as is the case with South African tax 
investigations, the sharing of taxpayer information across borders is also part of a larger investigation, 
with no assessment having been issued. Moreover, the tax treaty would require the receiving competent 
authority to maintain the secrecy of the taxpayer information as it would had it obtained the information 
under its own domestic legislation. The maintenance of secrecy by the receiving authority is comparable 
with the requirements placed on the NPA to maintain the confidentiality of the information it receives 




Domestically, further support for the above position might be drawn from judgements such as that in the 
Mistry case, 53 where a member of the public provided information to the Interim National Medical and 
Dental Council of South Africa (‘the Council’) about a possible violation of the law by the applicant, a 
medical doctor. The Council’s officials communicated this information to an official of the Department of 
Health who had a statutory responsibility for carrying out investigations into allegations of this sort. The 
applicant objected to this disclosure on the basis that violated his right to privacy. Importantly, all the 
officials involved were subject to the requirement of confidentiality. The court, in this instance, found no 
violation of the applicant’s right to privacy.  
It is submitted, however, that there are certain key shortcomings to the argument set out above. 
When the SARS shares the taxpayer information with the NPA, it does so in order to facilitate the 
prosecution of a domestic tax offence. The EoI process, on the other hand, is not necessarily undertaken 
as part of the investigation or prosecution of a tax offence. This is especially true in the case of EoIA (a 
point which is elaborated upon in a later section to this chapter). The purpose of a prosecution and the 
processes surrounding it is quite dissimilar from that of other investigations. Consequently, when 
analysing the balance struck between the harm done and the purpose achieved by the limitation, it would 
not be appropriate to equate the sharing of information with the NPA as part of a criminal investigation, 
with the disclosure of information to a foreign competent authority for investigative purposes.  
In terms of the receiving State’s treaty obligation to maintain the secrecy of the data obtained, it should be 
kept in mind that when taxpayers share private information with the SARS, their constitutional right to 
privacy is restricted. The restriction is deemed to be fair and justifiable in fair and open democratic 
society partly because of the fact that the information will be kept confidential by the SARS. The SARS’ 
duty to maintain the confidentiality of the taxpayer information does not mean that the taxpayer’s right to 
privacy has not been violated.  
Baker & Groenhagen draws the following distinction between confidentiality and privacy: 54 
“Confidentiality relates to the handling of information which has been supplied to the revenue 
authority and which should not be passed on to any other person in breach of that confidence: 
privacy relates to the right of an individual not to suffer any intrusion into his private or business 
life, his home or business premises unless that intrusion is necessary and is expressly authorized by 
law…. It goes without saying that any interference with a taxpayer’s right to privacy must be in 
accordance with the law and should not be disproportionate to the context of the investigation.” 
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The question is therefore whether the duty of the receiving government to maintain the secrecy of the 
taxpayer information (as per the treaty) is weighty enough to bring a sufficient degree of balance to the 
proportionality equation.  
In analysing this question, it is important to note that the tax treaty does not require the receiving 
government to uphold the South African Constitution and the protection afforded by the underlying 
legislation (such as chapter 6 of the TAA), but rather requires the State to treat the information as it 
would had it received it from its own domestic sources. 
The level of protection afforded to the taxpayer could therefore vary considerably from that enjoyed 
under South African law.   
Once the taxpayer information leaves South Africa and is placed in the hands of the foreign revenue 
authority, any breaches in the confidentiality of that information is no longer under the jurisdiction of the 
South African legal system. The taxpayer does not have any recourse against the foreign government in a 
South African court (compared to the recourse it would have against the NPA should the violation occur 
under their watch).  
This is a further differentiating factor between the sharing of information between the SARS and the NPA 
in the investigation of domestic tax offences, and the sharing of information between the SARS and a 
foreign government. Both the SARS and the NPA are subject to South African legislation and are 
answerable to the South African courts should they violate any South African law. The foreign 
government the SARS is sharing confidential taxpayer information with, is not.  
As Croome concludes: 55 
“A taxpayer should not be prejudiced such that information that would be protected in their home 
country is made known to another revenue authority which does not have similar privacy provisions 
as in his or her home State. That would constitute an undue violation of the taxpayer’s right to 
privacy and the taxpayer would in such a case have no remedy, because the violation is taking place 
in a foreign country.” 
It is submitted that one of the most troubling questions from a South African constitutional perspective 
arises as a result of the unequal degree of protection afforded by the receiving and requesting States, 
together with the limited remedies for a taxpayer in South Africa. 
Additional factors to consider when determining the reasonability of the violation would entail analysing 
the relation between the limitation, and its purpose. Can it be said that this limitation of the taxpayer’s 
right to privacy is causally linked with the purpose it pursues? What evidence might one produce to 
substantiate this claim? This question is considered separately under the sections below. 
                                                             




In assessing the reasonableness of the violation, it must also be asked whether there are less restrictive 
means to achieve the desired purpose. 
Specifically in the context of EoIR, alternative, less restrictive measures might include requiring the SARS 
to make an ex parte application to a judge in chambers before sharing the information (which would be 
similar to the rights currently afforded to South African taxpayers in instances where information is 
shared with the NPA in cases other than South African tax offence investigations). 
Another alternative, applicable to both EoIR and EoIA, might be to provide the taxpayer with prior notice 
of the intended exchange, as well as affording them the opportunity to lodge an objection should they feel 
that their rights will be unreasonably compromised should the information be shared.  
Others would, however, oppose the view that these alternative procedures will be able to meet the same 
objectives as the current process. This is discussed in more detail in Chapter 5 of this paper. 
The argument that the exchange of information is in reality, similar to a domestic tax offence 
investigation, becomes particularly strained in the context of EoIA given the very nature of EoIA, where 
the exchange is triggered automatically where certain fixed, predetermined criteria are met. 
The question of whether the extent of the restriction of the taxpayer’s right to privacy is justified 
therefore becomes even more compelling.  
Both FATCA and the OECD Standard stipulate various indicia which, if identified by the financial 
institution, would trigger an automatic exchange of that taxpayer’s information with that country. These 
indicia include having a mailing address or a telephone number in the reportable jurisdiction. The net is 
therefore cast quite widely – raising questions surrounding the necessity and proportionality of the 
exchange.  
Please refer to the separate discussion in this Chapter (dealing with the POPI Act) for further discussion 
and analysis of the safeguards currently contained in the various EoIA instruments, and the questions 
asked in a global stage regarding the necessity and proportionality of both FATCA, and the OECD 
Standard. 
4.4 The POPI Act and the current protection enjoyed by taxpayers during the EoI process 
4.4.1 The practical protection extended to data subjects by the POPI Act 
The POPI Act was first tabled in the South African parliament in 2009, and enacted in November 2013. 
Note that although enacted, almost all of the provisions of the Act are not yet effective – including those 
sections creating compliance obligations. 56 The reason for the delay in bringing the provisions into effect 
                                                             




is to afford affected parties the opportunity to put the necessary processes and safeguards in place to 
ensure their compliance with the Act, once effective.  
Given the interplay between EoI and the taxpayers’ fundamental right to privacy, however, one would be 
remiss not to consider the potential implications of the POPI Act on the processing of taxpayer 
information in South Africa. In particular, the interaction between the POPI Act and the current bilateral 
and multilateral exchange instruments should be analysed, along with the questions this raises regarding 
the manner in which the taxpayers’ constitutional rights are given effect in practice by the relevant 
parties responsible for processing the taxpayer information during the exchange process.   
The POPI Act, hailed by some as “the most comprehensive piece of privacy legislation in the world”57 when 
first introduced, was enacted: 58 
“to give effect to the constitutional right to privacy, by safeguarding personal information when 
processed by a responsible party, subject to justifiable limitations that are aimed at balancing the 
right to privacy against other rights … and protecting important interests, including the free flow of 
information within the Republic and across international borders”.  
The Act therefore has as its foundation section 14 of the Bill of Rights, read with the general limitation 
provision, section 36. 
The Act goes further to state that the purpose of the legislation is also to: 59 
“regulate the manner in which personal information may be processed, by establishing conditions, 
in harmony with international standards that prescribe the minimum threshold requirements for 
the lawful processing of information”.  
In developing the POPI Act, the South African Law Reform Commission took into consideration the 
approaches adopted internationally, including those by the European Union (‘EU’). This alignment with 
international best practice was emphasised during the parliamentary debates on the Bill. 60 It is therefore 
not surprising to find many similarities between the POPI Act and the EU Data Protection Directive.61 
Although a detailed discussion of the POPI Act falls beyond the scope of this paper, the Act, at its core, sets 
out the conditions under which the data subject’s personal information may be collected, as well as 
manner in which the data may be processed thereafter. It should be noted that the Act defines the 
‘processing’ of information very broadly to include any operation or activity, automatic or otherwise, 
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concerning personal information, including the collection, storage, use and transmission or distribution of 
the information. 62  
The POPI Act, inter alia, affords data subjects the right to have their personal information processed in a 
lawful manner, including the right to be notified that their personal information is being collected,63 to 
request the correction or deletion of their personal information held by others, 64 and to object, on 
reasonable grounds, to the processing of their information.65 
More specifically, the POPI Act stipulates the circumstances under which the data may be processed, 
which include where the data subjects have given their consent to the processing, or where the 
processing complies with an obligation imposed on the ‘responsible party’ (i.e. the party which 
determines the purpose of and means for the processing of the data) by law.66 The POPI Act further 
requires that where personal information is collected, it must be done so for a specific, explicitly defined 
and lawful purpose, and that any further processing must be done in accordance or compatible with this 
purpose.67 The responsible party must also to take steps to ensure that the data is complete, accurate, not 
misleading and updated where necessary.68 
The Act gives effect to the fundamental principle of proportionality, stipulating that personal information 
may only be processed if, given the purpose for which it is processed, it is adequate, relevant and not 
excessive. 69 It further places limitations on the retention of records for any period longer than is 
necessary for achieving the purpose for which it was gathered. 70 
Beyond the requirements surrounding the processing of personal information, the POPI Act requires that 
the data subjects must, inter alia, be informed (notified) that their personal information is being collected, 
the purpose for which it is being collected, the details of any law authorising the collection of their 
personal information, and where applicable, the responsible party’s intention to transfer the information 
to a third country, 71 including the level of protection afforded to the information by that third country. 72  
The duty to notify the data subject is also in keeping with the other obligations imposed on the 
responsible party by the Act. For example, the duty to take steps to ensure that the data being processed 
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66 POPI Act section 11(1). 
67 POPI Act sections 13 and 15. 
68 POPI Act section 16. 
69 POPI Act section 10. 
70 POPI Act section 14. 
71 Note that the term ‘third country’ is not defined in the POPI Act. It can be speculated that perhaps this term was 
taken directly from the EU Data Protection Directive, where it would refer to non-EU Member States. It is submitted 
that in the context of the POPI Act, it refers to all countries other than South Africa.  




is accurate and complete could in itself be argued to presuppose the need for the data subject to be 
notified of the processing and afforded the opportunity to correct the information, where needed. 
The POPI Act also contains provisions specifically regulating the transfer of personal information across 
national borders. 73 Personal information of the data subject may only be transferred to parties outside of 
South Africa if the receiving party is subject to substantially similar privacy rules as those prescribed by 
the POPI Act – including those surrounding the further processing of the information after having 
received it. 74  
As previously mentioned, the POPI Act does allow for reasonable limitations to the data subject’s right to 
privacy under certain, specified, circumstances. 
For example, the POPI Act does not apply to the processing of information by or on behalf of a public body 
for the purpose of investigating offences, 75 including the prevention or detection of unlawful activities 
and the combating of money laundering activities. Note that the term ‘money laundering’ is broadly 
defined under South African law, and would include transactions that involve the proceeds of tax 
offences. 76 
Other exclusions restrict the data subject’s right to be informed. In this regard, the POPI Act specifies that 
no notification is required in instances where this is necessary to avoid prejudice to the maintenance of 
the law by any public body; to comply with an obligation imposed by the law; or to enforce legislation 
concerning the collection of tax revenue. 77  
Note that these limitations are in line with those contained in Article 13 of the EU Data Protection 
Directive, which affords the Member States the right to include certain restrictions on the Directive’s 
provisions in their domestic legislation, where necessary (taxation matters are specifically listed as an 
example of when a restriction might be justified). 
4.4.2 The POPI Act and the current EoI framework 
Firstly, in order to establish whether EoI would be subject to the POPI Act, it should be considered 
whether the processing of information as part of the EoI process would form part of an investigation into 
an ‘offence’ (in which case the Act would not apply). 
Section 6(1)(c) of the POPI Act determines: 
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74 Note that the POPI Act also allows for the transfer of the data should the data subject consent to the transfer, or 
should the transfer part of the performance of a contract that the data subject is party to. As these two scenarios are 
arguably not applicable in the context of EoI, it will not be discussed further. 
75 POPI Act section 6(1)(c). 
76 Public Accountant’s and Auditor’s Board, “Money laundering and control: a guide for registered accountants and 
auditors”, June 2003, p. 8. 




“This Act does not apply to the processing of personal information by or on behalf of a public body - 
the purpose of which is the prevention, detection, including assistance in the identification of the 
proceeds of unlawful activities and the combating of money laundering activities, investigation or 
proof of offences …, to the extent that adequate safeguards have been established in legislation for 
the protection of such personal information;” 
The question is therefore twofold: is the EoI information gathering process undertaken by the SARS done 
so to detect, or as part of an investigation into an ‘offence’; and if so, have adequate safeguards been 
established in legislation for the protection of the information in question?  
As to the first question, it is submitted that the information gathered under the EoI process is not 
necessarily done with the express purpose of detecting or investigating an offence. For example, this 
would not be the case in instances where the information is gathered as part of an ordinary audit 
conducted by the revenue authorities, given that the purpose of an audit is to confirm compliance with 
the relevant tax legislation (i.e. not targeting tax offences, per se). This would be of particular relevance in 
the EoIA process, where the exchange is not done in pursuance of a specific inquiry into the taxpayer’s 
affairs, but is triggered by predetermined and presumptive criteria.  
The scope of the word ‘offence’, as contained in the POPI Act, must also be considered.  
Section 3(3) of the TAA allows the SARS to “obtain the information for transmission … as if it were relevant 
material required for the purposes of a tax Act” (i.e. as the SARS would gather the information in the 
context of its own, domestic information gathering procedures). It is submitted, however, that section 
3(3) of the TAA does not, on the wording of the provision, extend the meaning of the term ‘offence’ to 
other pieces of legislation such as the POPI Act. The term ‘offence’ is not defined in the POPI Act, and the 
Act does not include any deeming provision that would expressly include foreign offences (i.e. actions that 
would be seen to be offences under the laws of another State) within the scope of the term for the 
purposes of the POPI Act. It is therefore submitted that a foreign tax offence does not constitute an 
‘offence’ for the purposes of the POPI Act.  
Lastly, even should the first two questions be answered in the affirmative (about which there is 
considerable doubt), it would remain to be proved that adequate protection of the taxpayer’s right to 
privacy is contained in other legislation such as the ITA an TAA. This question is unpacked in further 
detail throughout this Chapter. In short, based on the analysis performed, it is not evident that the 
relevant provisions currently contained in the ITA and TAA alone are sufficiently robust to truly give 
effect to the taxpayer’s constitutional right to privacy in the EoI process. 
With the arguments presented above in mind, the discussion therefore proceeds on the basis that the 




Accordingly, as a next step, it should be considered whether there is any justification to restrict the data 
subject’s right to be notified that their information is being processed.78 
Could it be argued that the notification would prejudice the maintenance of any law79 – i.e. defeating the 
purpose of the EoI process? It could be contended that providing the affected taxpayer with prior notice 
of the exchange would merely ‘tip off’ the suspected offender, allowing them to delay and frustrate the 
investigation into their tax affairs. 
Please refer to the discussion that follows in Chapter 5 regarding the right to administrative justice for a 
more detailed discussion in this regard. In short, there are many questions that cast doubt on the validity 
of the ‘tip off’ defence as a justification for the blanket denial of the right to be notified. 
Specifically, in the context of the EoIA, there is an argument that the sheer volume of persons affected 
would make notification impractical. This contention might, however, fail to convince in an age where, in 
South Africa at least, it is common practice for account holders to be notified by the relevant financial 
institution via text message or email should there be any transaction processed to their accounts. It is 
therefore difficult to understand how the same technology cannot be employed to notify data subjects 
that their personal information is being collected and transferred in accordance with the relevant treaty 
and TAA (especially given that this technology is also already being used by the SARS to keep taxpayers 
informed of the status of their income tax returns filed via the SARS’ online electronic filing system). 
Could it then be said that the right to notification is restricted in order to comply with an obligation under 
the provisions of any law (including those governing the collection of revenue)?80 
In both EoIR and EoIA it is submitted that no Act (not the POPI Act, ITA or TAA) specifically prohibits the 
SARS from informing any taxpayer of the pending exchange of his or her personal information. 
It should be noted, however, that it would not be necessary to obtain the data subjects’ consent to process 
their data, given that the processing is done by virtue of the obligations imposed on the responsible party 
by a law (namely the relevant international agreement, TIEA, and TAA). Again, it must be emphasised that 
although the EoI is permitted by law, the manner in which this is done and the protection afforded to the 
taxpayer during the exchange process is a separate matter.  
It is clear, therefore, that once effective, the detailed POPI Act will have a significant impact on the manner 
in which data is processed in South Africa and the specific protection that must be afforded to the data 
subject during the process. The parties within South Africa responsible for the processing of taxpayer 
information will be not be excluded from the ambit of the POPI Act as it currently reads. 
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It should be borne in mind, however, that the POPI Act has been enacted to provide the detailed 
procedures designed to give effect to the rights already granted to taxpayers by the Constitution. 
Arguably, therefore, these safeguards should have already be in place in practice. 
In the context of EoI, the POPI Act provisions of particular importance will be those surrounding the 
circumstances under which the data subject’s information may be processed, the conditions and 
safeguards which must be in place before the data is transferred across national borders, as well as the 
transparency of the EoI process (i.e. the notification of the taxpayer concerned). 
For example, as mentioned, currently, most of the existing double tax treaties stipulate that the data 
protection and confidentiality rules of the receiving State will be applied to the data exchanged. This 
would be at odds with the relevant provision in the POPI Act which prohibits the cross-border transfer of 
information where the receiving State does not uphold substantially similar data protection rules as in 
South Africa. 81 Many of South Africa’s double tax treaties go further to stipulate the EoI is not required 
where this would be at odds with the supplying State’s domestic laws and administrative practices (see 
for example the SA-US 1997 treaty to which the FATCA IGA is tethered82). The implication of these 
provisions is that they would preclude EoI in instances where the SARS fails to definitively establish that 
the data protection standards in place in the receiving State are sufficiently robust.  
Furthermore, the POPI Act prohibits the processing of data for a purpose that is not relevant, adequate or 
that would be considered excessive. 83 In the case of EoIA (where a large range of indicators regarding a 
taxpayer’s potential taxable presence in a country automatically triggers an exchange) the bulk and 
somewhat indiscriminate exchange of vast amounts of personal information may be excessive (and 
potentially irrelevant).  
The impact of section 108(5) of the ITA will also need to be considered (section 108(5) stating that the 
exchange shall not be prevented by any secrecy provision contained in any law). As stated previously in 
this chapter, section 108(5) of the ITA does allow for the deviation from secrecy provisions prescribed in 
any law (which would include the POPI Act), however, this does not equate to a blanket authority being 
granted to all those involved in the EoI process to disregard the constitutional rights of the taxpayer. For 
any violation to be lawful, it must still be proven to be reasonable, justifiable and in terms of a law of 
general application.  
Given that the POPI Act has its foundations in the EU Data Protection Directive, the questions raised 
regarding the potential impact of the POPI Act on the EoI processes in South Africa should also be viewed 
in the light of recent developments in Europe. Please refer to the section that follows for further 
discussion. 
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4.4.3 Recent developments in the EU in the field of EoIA 
Given that the privacy provisions contained in the POPI Act and the various EoI mechanisms are not 
unique to South Africa, it comes as no surprise that the questions highlighted in the previous section have 
also been raised on a global stage. 
It is not disputed that one should apply a healthy dose of caution when attempting to interpret the 
interaction of South African domestic legislation with its treaty obligations in the light of international 
developments and foreign case law in the field.  In this specific instance, however, it is argued that as the 
South African treaties, as well as the POPI Act have their foundation in international instruments, much 
can be gained from an analysis of the developments beyond South Africa’s borders. Arguably, even more 
so in the case of the POPI Act and the EoIA instruments, given that one of the intended purposes of the Act 
is to bring South Africa’s domestic standards in line with those applied internationally.   
In two 2012 letters to the European Commission’s Director General of Taxation and Customs Union, the 
Article 29 Data Protection Working Party84 raises serious concerns regarding the compatibility of certain 
obligations under FATCA (and the accompanying IGAs), and the EU Data Protection Directive. 85  
Amongst other concerns, the Working Party questions the necessity of the FATCA for Europe. Although it 
could potentially be argued to be necessary and justified from a US perspective (given that it will grant 
the Internal Revenue Service (‘IRS’) access to information they deem necessary to administer their tax 
laws), it is less clear whether it is equally necessary from the supplying State’s perspective – especially 
given the non-reciprocal nature of the agreement.  
In determining whether there is a ‘necessity’ for the processing of the taxpayers’ data, the Working Party 
goes further to say that: 86  
“This requires ensuring that there is a lawful basis for the processing through careful assessment of 
how FATCA’s goals balance with that of the EU’s fundamental right enshrined in Article 8 of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights – the right to a private and family life, i.e. by demonstrating 
necessity by proving that the required data are the minimum necessary in relation to the purpose. A 
bulk transfer and the screening of all data is not the best way to achieve such a goal. Therefore more 
selective, less broad measures should be considered in order to respect the privacy of law-abiding 
citizens, particularly; an examination of alternative, less privacy-intrusive means must to be carried 
out to demonstrate FATCA’s necessity. 
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[The Working Party] respects the legitimate goal of the US government to ensure tax compliance, 
but stresses that it must be done in accordance with the Directive, respect for Article 8 of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights and Convention for the protection of individuals with regard to 
automatic processing of personal data (Convention 108). However in the absence of a lawful basis 
to legitimise the processing required, [the Working Party] does not see how compliance of FATCA 
and the Directive could be simultaneously achieved.” 
On the basis that there will be no reciprocal transfer of data from the US to South Africa, could the 
argument be made that a unilateral decision taken in a foreign country (the US), in pursuance of their 
own domestic interests, necessitates the bulk transfer of taxpayer information and the resultant violation 
of taxpayer rights in South Africa? 
The Working Party goes further to raise questions surrounding the proportionality of the processing of 
the data. 87 Can it be said that the personal information requested to be shared under FATCA is 
proportional to its goal? Could this goal not be achieved through less restrictive means?  
The Working Party also warns the relevant role players (namely the financial institutions and the 
competent authorities) that they would still be required to comply with the parameters set out in the 
Data Protection Directive when processing the taxpayers’ data under FATCA, including the obligations of 
transparency, and keeping the data subject informed of what is happening to their personal     
information. 88  
Similarly, in a South African context, should it be accepted that the EoI information gathering and 
exchange process does not fall within any of the exceptions to the POPI Act, the SARS and the relevant 
financial institutions would have to comply with the POPI Act when processing the taxpayer’s data per 
the FATCA IGA. Specifically, when processing the relevant taxpayer’s information, it would have to be 
evaluated whether the processing, and extent thereof is justified given the purpose thereof. 
Following their work done in relation to the interaction between the EU Data Protection Directive and 
FATCA, the Working Party also published a number of letters and reports dealing with the 
implementation of the OECD Standard in Europe. 
As is the case with the FATCA IGA, the protection afforded to taxpayers under the OECD Standard will also 
be those contained in the underlying bilateral or multilateral tax treaty. Typically, these treaties will also 
stipulate that the confidentiality rules of the receiving State will be applied to the data exchange. In 
recognition of the potential conflict this might create with existing data protection laws across the globe, 
the OECD Standard, does, however, contain specific provisions relating to the confidentiality of taxpayer 
information exchanged. 
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Section 5, paragraph 1 of the Model CAA reads as follows: 
“All information exchanged is subject to the confidentiality rules and other safeguards provided for 
in the [Convention]/[Instrument], including the provisions limiting the use of the information 
exchanged and, to the extent needed to ensure the necessary level of protection of personal data, in 
accordance with the safeguards which may be specified by the supplying Competent Authority as 
required under its domestic law.” 
The OECD Standard therefore creates the scope for the county supplying the information to stipulate the 
data security safeguards which must be maintained in the receiving country in relation to the data 
supplied.  
The Commentary to paragraph 1 of section 5 reads as follows: 89  
“Many jurisdictions have specific rules on the protection of personal data which apply to taxpayer 
information. For example, special data protection rules apply to information exchanges by EU 
Member States (whether the exchange is made to another EU Member State or a third jurisdiction). 
These rules include, inter alia, the data subject’s right to information, access, correction, redress, 
and the existence of an oversight mechanism to protect the data subject’s rights. Paragraph 1 of 
Section 5 provides that the supplying Competent Authority may, to the extent needed to ensure the 
necessary level of protection of personal data, specify in the Competent Authority Agreement the 
particular safeguards that must be respected, as required under its domestic law. The Competent 
Authority receiving the information must ensure the practical implementation and observance of 
any safeguarding specified. The Competent Authority receiving the information shall treat the 
information in compliance not only with its own domestic law, but also with additional safeguards 
that may be required to ensure data protection under the domestic law of the supplying Competent 
Authority.”  
To ensure that the requirements of the POPI Act surrounding the cross-border transfer of information are 
met, South Africa should specify in its CAAs that safeguards substantially similar to those provided for in 
the POPI Act are maintained in the receiving State. 
In the EU, the European Commission in December 2014 adopted Council Directive 2014/107/EU (which 
amended the Directive 2011/16/EU on Administrative Cooperation in the Field of Taxation). The 
Directive, as amended, aims to extend mandatory EoIA across EU Member States in accordance with the 
OECD Standard. Importantly, the amendments to the Directive specifically include provisions which make 
it clear that the Data Protection Directive must be adhered to when taxpayer information is processed 
during the EoIA process. 90 Specifically, the amendments obliges each Member State to ensure that the 
affected data subjects are informed of the fact that their personal information is to be collected and 
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transferred internationally, and that they are provided with the necessary information in sufficient time 
to enable them to exercise their data protection rights before the information is exchanged. 
In a statement released on 4 February 2015, 91 the Working Party again raised serious concerns regarding 
the compatibility of the amended Directive 2011/16/EU and the OECD Standard with the EU Data 
Protection Directive. 
Concerns were once again raised regarding whether the mass collection and transfer of data could be said 
to meet the fundamental principles of purpose and necessity. Following a recent decision by the Court of 
Justice of the European Union in the Digital Rights Ireland case92 invalidating the Data Retention Directive 
(Directive 2006/24/EU) on similar grounds, the Working Party warns that: 93 
“in order not to violate the proportionality principle, it is necessary to demonstrably prove the 
necessity of the foreseen processing and that the required data are the minimum necessary for 
attaining the stated purpose and thus avoid, an indiscriminate, massive collection and transfer.”    
This concern was echoed in the European Data Protection Supervisor’s opinion dealing with the 
agreement entered into between the EU and Switzerland on the automatic exchange of tax information94 
(which is based on the OECD Standard).  
In relation to the proportionality of the data collection and transfer under the agreement, the Opinion 
states the following: 95 
“The relationship between legitimate public policy goals and protection of personal data has been 
addressed by the European Court of Justice in its Digital Rights Ireland judgment. In fact, based on 
the Court judgment annulling Directive No 2006/24/EC (Data Retention Directive applied to 
persons for whom there was no evidence capable of suggesting that their conduct might have a link, 
even an indirect or remote one with criminal activity), measures introducing massive and 
indiscriminate collection of data are deemed not to be proportionate, if they fail to narrow down the 
types of persons who can be targeted as individuals suspected of a crime.  
Therefore, we consider that the Agreement should have included provisions and criteria that 
explicitly link the reporting of personal data concerning financial accounts to possible tax evasion 
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and that exempt low-risk accounts from reporting. In this respect, such criteria should be applicable 
ex ante to determine which accounts (and which information) would need to be reported. Only at 
that stage -once the relevance (or irrelevance) of the reporting for the purpose of countering tax 
evasion has been established- the electronic search might help determining the residence of the 
account holder.”  
Given that the ‘necessity’ and ‘proportionality’ criterion of the Data Protection Directive are echoed not 
only in the POPI Act, but also in section 36 of the South African Constitution, it is certainly fair to argue 
that the concerns and recommendations raised by the Working Party and Data Protection Supervisor 
warrant further investigation in South Africa as well. 
Interestingly, it should be noted that although modelled on the EU Directives dealing with the automatic 
exchange of tax information, this EU-Switzerland agreement does not include all the amendments 
contained in Directive 2014/107/EU – specifically those dealing with the notification of the data subject. 
The Data Protection Supervisor duly included the following recommendation: 96 
“the Agreement should have specified that information on data transfers should be provided to the 
data subject with a reasonable delay before the actual exchange of the data takes place (so that the 
individual concerned gets time to defend himself if relevant). The information provided should at 
the minimum inform the data subjects of the fact that their personal data will be sent to a 
competent authority for the purpose of fighting tax evasion, include a list of the category of data 
sent and the contact of the controller in their country of residence and inform them of their right to 
object and their right of redress.”  
Given the similarities between the relevant EU directive and agreements and South African legal 
framework in this regard, it is submitted that this obligation to notify the data subject will be equally 
applicable in South Africa. 
4.5 Summary remarks 
The key questions that arise from an analysis of the current protection of the taxpayer’s right to privacy 
centre around whether that right is violated during the EoI process, and to what extent that violation 
erodes the proportionality of the limitation. 
In dissecting these questions the difference between ‘confidentiality’ and ‘privacy’ should be borne in 
mind. The obligation on the part of the competent authorities to maintain the confidentiality of exchanged 
information does not necessarily mean that no violation of the taxpayer’s privacy has occurred.  
In a purely domestic context, the SARS must operate within strict secrecy provisions spelled out in the 
TAA. This plays a critical role in bringing balance to the harm done by the intrusion into the private lives 
of the taxpayers when they disclose their information to the SARS, and the purpose of the restriction. In 
                                                             




the context of EoI, however, these secrecy provisions are watered down in South Africa, with the taxpayer 
information being transferred to foreign competent authorities purely at the discretion of the SARS 
without any participation by the affected taxpayers. 
This raises concerns surrounding whether the imposition on the taxpayer’s constitutionally guaranteed 
right to privacy is ‘reasonable’ and ‘justifiable’ and in accordance with a ‘law of general application’, as 
required by section 36 of the Constitution. 
Specifically, the discretion afforded to the SARS in the EoI process is effectively unrestrained by the 
provisions of the ITA and TAA (with the POPI Act not yet being effective), indicating that the SARS’ 
limitation of the taxpayer’s right to privacy is not performed in accordance with a ‘law of general 
application’.  
Questions are also raised regarding the reasonableness and proportionality of said limitation. 
When the taxpayer’s information is transferred to the foreign tax authority, it is not clear to what extent 
(or whether at all) the SARS ensures that the receiving State will uphold substantially similar 
confidentiality safeguards in relation to the exchanged information. 
This current lack of protection afforded to taxpayers during the EoI process in practice significantly 
erodes the proportionality between the harm done and the purpose of the exercise potentially to the 
point where the hurdles put in place by section 36 of the Constitution, namely the ‘reasonable’ and 
‘justifiable’ criterion, are no longer cleared.  
This is of particular relevance in the context of EoIA, where the exchange of information is triggered 
purely by the taxpayer having met any one of a set of broad presumptive criteria. Serious misgivings have 
also been voiced on a global stage (in the EU in particular) regarding the necessity and proportionality of 
the current EoIA framework (as set out in the OECD Standard and FATCA IGAs). It is submitted that these 
concerns are of relevance in South Africa as well, and will become of even greater importance once the 
provisions of the POPI Act become effective (given the alignment of the POPI Act with the EU Data 
Protection Directive).  
The impact of the coming into effect of the POPI Act on the protection afforded to taxpayers in both the 
EoIA and EoIR process will be significant. This is because the EoI process will be subject to the provisions 
of the POPI Act and will not fall within the exemptions to the Act. Further investigation into the 
procedures and safeguards to be put into practice by both the SARS and the relevant financial institutions 
(in the context of EoIA) to ensure POPI Act compliance, is warranted.  
In summary, the following recommendations are put forward to address the shortcomings identified by 
the analysis performed in this Chapter: 
 Legislation should be developed to circumscribe the discretionary powers currently afforded to the 




to deviate from the TAA chapter 6 secrecy provisions) should be amended to take into account the 
coming into effect of the 1996 Constitution. Furthermore, guidance should be provided in legislation 
as to what would constitute ‘necessary’ or ‘foreseeably relevant’ information in the context of the tax 
treaties’ EoI clauses. 
 The above-mentioned new legislation should give effect to the POPI Act by providing detailed rules as 
to how the taxpayer’s constitutionally guaranteed right to privacy is to be protected in practice 
during the EoI process. This would include the prior notification of the affected taxpayer by the SARS. 
Safeguards that must be in place before the information can be transmitted to foreign governments 
must also be stipulated. 
 Finally, also in the context of EoIA, the SARS should exercise its right under section 5 of the OECD 
Standard’s CAA to insist that the receiving State’s data security standards are similar to that of South 








CHAPTER 5: THE RIGHT TO JUST ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 
Section 33 of the Constitution 
(1) Everyone has the right to just administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally 
fair. 
(2) Everyone whose rights have been adversely affected by administrative action has the right to be 
given written reasons. 
(3) National legislation must be enacted to give effect to these rights, and must –  
(a) provide for the review of administrative action by a court or, where appropriate, an independent 
and impartial tribunal; 
(b) impose a duty on the State to give effect to the rights in subsection (1) and (2); and 
(c) promote an efficient administration.  
5.1 Introduction  
Internationally, it is rare to find the right to administrative justice codified in a bill of rights. 97 This 
inclusion of the fundamental principles of administrative law in the South African Bill of Rights must be 
viewed in the context of South Africa’s political history, which was for a long period characterised by the 
abuse of government power and executive autocracy. 98 The Constitution therefore protects the review of 
administrative power against legislative and executive interference and provides relief for those affected 
by unlawful administration.99  
Hoexter summarises the position as follows: 100 
“Thus the legislature can no longer simply authorise the administration to depart from the 
fundamental principles of administrative justice that have been guaranteed in the Constitution. Any 
such authorisation would have to be justified under the limitation clause, section 36, in order to be 
constitutionally acceptable”. 
Section 33(3) of the Constitution requires “legislation to be enacted to give effect to these rights”. 
Accordingly, the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act101 (‘PAJA’) was enacted for this express purpose. 
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This chapter will analyse the questions raised by the current protection afforded to taxpayers in the EoI 
process in the light of the constitutional right to just administrative action, as given effect to by the PAJA. 
5.2 The Promotion of Administrative Justice Act and EoI 
Should EoI amount to ‘administrative action’ as defined in the PAJA, the protection afforded to the 
taxpayer in the process will be subject to the provisions and requirements of the PAJA. 
Importantly, therefore, it must be established whether the PAJA applies to the EoI process. 
5.2.1 EoI and ‘administrative action’ under the PAJA 
The PAJA defines ‘administrative action’ in section 1 as: 
“any decision taken, or any failure to take a decision, by – 
a) An organ of State when – 
i) exercising a power in terms of the Constitution or a provincial constitution; or 
ii) exercising a public power or performing a public function in terms of any legislation;…” 
Section 2 of the South African Revenue Services Act102 provides as follows: 
“The South African Revenue Services is hereby established as an organ of State within the public 
administration but as an institution outside the public service”. 
As an organ of State, the PAJA applies to the decisions of the Commissioner and his officials. 103 
When it comes to determining whether an action taken by an organ of State, such as the SARS, is 
administrative action for the purposes of the PAJA, there is a degree of interplay between the various 
definitions contained in the Act. Hoexter summarises the effective result of the interrelation of definitions 
as follows: 104 
“In summary, an action will qualify as administrative action under the PAJA if it is: 
1. A decision 
2. By an organ of State (…) 
3. When exercising a public power or performing  a public function 
4. In terms of any legislation (or in terms of an empowering provision) 
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5. That adversely affects rights 
6. That has direct, external legal effect 
7. And, that is not specifically excluded by the list of exclusions in subparas (aa) to (ii) of the 
definition of administrative action” 
5.2.1.1 EoI, as a ‘decision’ envisaged by the PAJA 
A ‘decision’ is defined in section 1 of the PAJA as: 
“Any decision of an administrative nature made, proposed to be made, or required to be made, as 
the case may be, under an empowering provision,… and a reference to a failure to make a decision 
must be construed accordingly.” 
For the purposes of the PAJA, the term ‘decision’ encompasses both the making of a decision of an 
administrative nature, as well as the failure to make such a decision. 
It would be useful to firstly determine whether there has been any failure to make a decision on the part 
of the SARS when exchanging information. This question would be of particular relevance in the context 
of EoIA, where the exchange is based on a set of objective, presumptive criteria. The process therefore 
does not require application of mind by a decision maker in each instance where information is harvested 
by financial institutions and passed automatically to a competent authority of another State by the SARS.  
According to Hoexter, a ‘decision’ would usually, but not inevitably, encompass certain features, including 
the gathering of information, an evaluative process, reaching a conclusion and an exercise of power based 
on the conclusion. 105 
Given Hoexter’s description of what a ‘decision’ entails for purposes of PAJA, it could be argued that the 
EoIA process in particular is so rigidly automated that it erodes the decisiveness or determinative nature 
of a revenue official’s involvement in the process.  
In South Africa, at present, the only functions known, with reasonable certainty, to be performed by a 
SARS official during the EoIA process include: collating the information received from the various 
financial institutions; determining whether the foreign country identified by the various indicia is a treaty 
partner of South Africa; and handling the actual transmittal of the data to the foreign competent 
authority.106  
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Beyond the actions listed above, it is not publically known what other tasks and procedures the SARS will 
undertake before exchanging the information in bulk with the relevant receiving States. For example, it is 
not known whether a SARS official will conduct any procedures to independently test the accuracy of the 
financial information to be shared or the accuracy of the indicia identified by the relevant financial 
institutions.    
Should the SARS’ role in the EoIA process be limited to the menial procedural tasks listed previously, 
there would be a failure on the part of the SARS officials to apply their minds to the substance of the 
information to be exchanged and, for example, whether this information is necessary or foreseeably 
relevant to the enforcement of the contracting State’s tax laws. Expressed in terms of Hoexter’s definition, 
the SARS’ EoIA procedures will lack an evaluative process, and the subsequent reaching of a conclusion, 
and could therefore be argued to amount to a ‘failure to make a decision’. 
Although it is also not clear what the extent of the SARS’ evaluative process is under EoIR, it would be fair 
to assume that given the difference in the very nature of the two exchange mechanisms and the volume of 
data involved, these processes would likely be more robust under EoIR than under EoIA.   
Should it be accepted that, under EoIR there is no ‘failure to make a decision’ on the part of the SARS, it 
remains to be considered whether the SARS makes a ‘decision’ as envisaged by the PAJA, when 
exchanging taxpayer information upon request. 
Accordingly, it must firstly be considered whether the decision to share the information would be of an 
‘administrative nature’. 
In this respect, commentators have warned against taking too narrow a view of what is meant by the 
phrase ‘of an administrative nature’, given that the PAJA is intended to give effect to the constitutional 
right to administrative action (which has been held to apply to conduct connected to the daily business of 
government, that includes the making of delegated legislation, adjudication processes and 
administration).107 
Croome provides a list of decisions made by the SARS that would be of an administrative nature (and 
hence constitute ‘administrative action’ under the PAJA). Included in this list is the decision on whether to 
conduct an audit into the affairs of the taxpayer. 108 
It is submitted that the decision to share information across national borders also falls within the ambit of 
the PAJA definition of a ‘decision’, since it involves the administration of South Africa’s information 
exchange obligations under tax treaties.  The aim of the treaty clauses being to assist in the audits of 
taxpayer compliance with the tax laws of the countries that are party to the treaty. 
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Secondly, the PAJA definition of a ‘decision’ requires that the decision is made under an ‘empowering 
provision’, and in accordance with ‘any legislation’. 
‘Empowering provision’ is widely defined in section 1 of the PAJA, and includes a law, a rule of common 
law, customary law, an agreement, instrument, or other document in terms of which an administrative 
action was taken.  
A provision of the TAA, such as section 3 that allows for the exchange of taxpayer information in 
accordance with South Africa’s treaty obligations, would certainly fall within this definition. So too, 
arguably, might the treaty itself fall within this definition because once approved by Parliament and 
Gazetted, the provisions of the treaty have the same standing as if it had been enacted in the ITA.109  
In the context of EoIR, the SARS therefore does make a ‘decision’, when sharing the taxpayer information 
as requested. In terms of EoIA, the SARS’ failure to vet or otherwise subject the relevant data to some 
form of evaluative process to assess the accuracy or foreseeable relevance of the information would 
amount to a ‘failure to make a decision’. 
Both EoIA and EoIR would therefore fall within the meaning of ‘decision’ for the purposes of 
administrative action under the PAJA. Any reference to ‘decision’ in the discussion that follows should be 
read in this context.  
5.2.1.2 The decision to exchange taxpayer information and the adverse, direct, external legal 
effect on the taxpayer’s rights 
The inclusion of the requirement for the decision to adversely affect the rights of the taxpayer, with 
direct, external legal effect, could be the most complex aspect to apply in the context of EoI. 
Indeed, generally speaking and beyond its implications in the context of exchange of information, the 
inclusion of the requirement (in its current form and wording) has muddied the waters somewhat in 
interpreting what exactly is meant by ‘administrative action’ under the PAJA.110 
The two key elements of the requirement which are likely to have the most determinative effect on any 
discussion surrounding administrative action in the context of EoI will be unpacked and addressed 
separately below.  
5.2.1.2.1 The ‘adverse’ effect on the taxpayer’s ‘rights’ 
Firstly, when taxpayer information is exchanged, how could the taxpayer’s ‘rights’ be ‘affected’ adversely? 
As to what is meant by ‘rights’, several judgements have turned on adopting a less strict interpretation of 
the word. 
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In the Transnet case, 111 for example, ‘rights’ were construed to include the applicant’s fundamental right 
to administrative action. In this case, the court held that the applicant’s right to fair administrative action 
would be adversely affected if they were not given reasons for the failure to have been awarded a tender 
(as opposed to trying to determine whether the applicant had a right to be awarded the tender or not). 
The reasoning being that without being given reasons for the failure, the applicant will have no way of 
knowing whether their right to just administrative action had been violated. 
In the Bullock case,112 Cloete JA suggested that ‘rights’ in this context should not be restricted to those 
enforceable in a court of law (albeit that the judgement was delivered in the context of the interim 
Constitution). 
Similarly, support for a more liberal interpretation to the phrase ‘adversely affects the right of any person’ 
can also be found in Nugent JA’s judgement in the Grey’s Marine case: 113 
“While PAJA’s definition purports to restrict administrative action to decisions that, as a fact, 
‘adversely affect the rights of any person’, I do not think that literal meaning could have been 
intended. For administrative action to be characterised by its effect in particular cases (either 
beneficial or adverse) seems to me to be paradoxical and also finds no support from the 
construction that has until now been placed in s 33 of the Constitution… The qualification, 
particularly when seen in conjunction with the requirement that it must have a ‘direct and external 
legal effect’, was probably intended rather to convey that administrative action is action that has 
the capacity to affect legal rights, the two qualifications in tandem serving to emphasise that 
administrative action impacts directly and immediately on individuals.”  
Under this interpretation credence is given to an action’s mere capacity to impact someone’s ‘rights’. 
Should one therefore determine that the taxpayer’s right to, for example, privacy, has been impacted or 
affected during the EoI process, 114 it will certainly be reasonable to conclude that the taxpayer’s rights 
have been ‘adversely’ affected for the purposes of the PAJA. To otherwise deny that the PAJA applies 
would mean that the remedies afforded under PAJA (e.g. the right to be notified, to make representations 
or to be given reasons for deciding to exchange information) would not be available to taxpayers.  This 
would be an illogical outcome given that these remedies are the ultimate and practical realisation of the 
right to just administrative action. 
5.2.1.2.2 The direct, external legal effect of the EoI decision 
Secondly, should one be able to establish that the taxpayer’s rights have been adversely affected, it 
remains to be determined whether this has been done with ‘direct’ ‘external’ legal effect. 
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The requirement, which has its origins in German law, 115 seems to add an additional distinct hurdle to be 
cleared, namely that the decision must be conclusive or final. This requirement for the decision to be ‘ripe’ 
would seemingly ensure that only once final, and no longer subject to change, will it fall within the ambit 
of ‘administrative action’.  
An argument could be made that this insistence on finality could be interpreted so as to exclude all 
preliminary decisions from ‘administrative action’. This interpretation of the requirement would arguably 
be in line with the German law which inspired the phrase. 
Hoexter, citing Pfaff and Schneider, provides the following guidance as to the original German 
interpretation of the phrase: 116 
“If, for example, a decision requires several steps to be taken by different authorities, only the last of 
which is directed at the citizen, all previous steps taken within the sphere of public administration 
lack direct effect, and only the last decision may be taken to court for review….Therefore, all the 
preparatory decisions are in principle not reviewable by the administrative courts.” 
This interpretation would therefore see preliminary decisions falling short of the scope of ‘administrative 
action’ under the PAJA. 
Given that some have argued that EoI merely forms part of an investigative process, this interpretation 
could have a significant impact as to whether the provisions of the PAJA would apply to the EoI 
process.117  In other words, on this view the exchange is merely part of the process leading up to a final 
decision and does not involve the final decision itself. The argument being that only once the information 
is used to make a decision to, for example, issue an additional assessment, are the taxpayer’s rights 
affected with direct, external legal effect. All other decisions leading up to this (such as sharing the 
information with the requesting State) are merely preparatory to the final decision and therefore do not 
have a direct external effect on the taxpayer. 
Internationally, this view appears to be held by many countries118 and is supported by a recent decision of 
the Court of Justice of the European Union in the Sabou case.119   
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In South Africa, the courts have in the past found that a mere investigation on its own would not typically 
qualify as having a direct external effect.120  
Importantly, however, although the South African legislation has its roots in the German law, the local 
interpretation of the phrase will be the key determining factor. In the New Clicks case it was held that: 121 
“transplanting provisions…into our legal and constitutional framework may produce results 
different from those obtained in the countries from which they have been taken”. 
Hoexter, in criticism of the German interpretation (as employed in South African common law in the 
past), further notes that: 122 
“This reasoning has since been subjected to vigorous reappraisal by the Supreme Court of Appeal, 
and our courts have recognised that preliminary or intermediate decisions can have significant and 
even devastating effects on individuals[123]. It may make practical sense to place some limits on the 
reviewability of preliminary action but…it would be a great pity if the term ‘direct’ were to be read 
as flatly contradicting this jurisprudence or as rendering preliminary decision-making entirely 
unreviewable.”  
Other indications that would point to strict adherence to the German interpretation being somewhat 
misplaced in a South Africa would be the fact that the PAJA definition of ‘decision’ still makes specific 
reference to decisions “proposed to be made”,  which indicates that the preparatory stages of the decision 
making process are not meant to be automatically excluded from ‘administrative action’. 
Moreover, as discussed in further detail later in this chapter, sections 3 and 4 of the PAJA set out specific 
procedures to be followed before decisions are made.  This too indicates that the PAJA was not merely 
enacted to enable the review administrative decisions after the fact. 
In the Digital case, the Supreme Court of Appeal (‘SCA’) quoted Lawrence Baxter on determining what is 
meant by ‘ripeness’ and held as follows: 124  
“the appropriate criterion by which the ripeness of the action in question is to be measured is 
whether prejudice has already resulted, or is inevitable, irrespective of whether the action is 
complete or not.” 
This interpretation is more appropriate considering what the aims are of entrenched constitutional 
rights, namely to give practical effect by advancing remedies to prevent prejudice.  The SCA’s approach in 
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the Digital case unties the Gordian knot between the one view that exchange of information is an 
intermediary step in a larger investigation, and the other that it is the final step in a process unto itself.  If 
one applies the SCA’s approach to the issue of ‘ripeness’ to EoI in a South African context, then the 
following question arises: Are the taxpayer’s rights affected, or is it inevitable that they will be affected, 
when a ‘decision’ is taken to share confidential information with foreign revenue authorities? 
If one accepts that rights are affected, then the ‘direct external legal effect’ hurdle is cleared. For example, 
as far as the taxpayer’s right to privacy is concerned, decisions or failures to decide upon EoI does have an 
adverse effect, as was discussed in Chapter 4.  
In summary, for the reasons set out above, it appears reasonably certain EoI constitutes administrative 
action for the purposes of the PAJA. 
5.2.2 The protection that must be afforded to the taxpayer under the PAJA 
Section 3 of the PAJA provides the basis for the obligations imposed by PAJA on the State and the 
protection thereby afforded to the subjects of the administrative action. It determines that: 
“Administrative action which materially and adversely affects the rights or legitimate expectations 
of any person must be procedurally fair.” 
Interestingly, with the inclusion of the reference to the ‘legitimate expectations’ of the person, the 
language of section 3 is much broader than that of the definition of ‘administrative action’ in section 1.  
Section 3 seemingly extends the requirement for procedural fairness beyond the section 1 definition.  125 
Although much has been made of this apparent contradiction between the section 1 and section 3 
definitions of ‘administrative action’,126 suffice to say that if the narrower section 1 definition is met, so 
too is that of section 3. 
Section 3 goes on to determine that: 
“(2)(a) A fair administrative procedure depends on the circumstances of each case. 
(b) In order to give effect to the right to procedurally fair administrative action, an administrator, 
subject to subsection (4), must give a person referred to in subsection (1) –  
(i) adequate notice of the nature and purpose of the proposed administrative action;  
(ii) a reasonable opportunity to make representations; 
(iii) a clear statement of the administrative action; 
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(iv) adequate notice of any right of review or internal appeal, where applicable; and 
(v) adequate notice of the right to request reasons on terms of section 5. 
(3) … 
(4)(a) If it is reasonable and justifiable in the circumstances, an administrator may depart from the 
requirements referred to in subsection (2). 
(b) … 
(5) Where an administrator is empowered by any empowering provision to follow a procedure 
which is fair, but different from the provisions of subsection (2), the administrator may act in 
accordance with that different procedure.” 
Except for situations where sections 3(4) and 3(5) are applicable, in order for the administrative action to 
be procedurally fair under the PAJA, the taxpayer must be given adequate notice of the proposed 
administrative action, the nature and purpose thereof, and be afforded a reasonable opportunity to make 
representations. 
Quoting Hoexter, the Constitutional Court in the Joseph case held that: 127 
“Procedural fairness … is concerned with giving people an opportunity to participate in the decisions 
that will affect them, and – crucially – a chance of influencing the outcome of those decisions. Such 
participation is a safeguard that not only respect for the dignity and worth of the participants, but is 
also likely to improve the quality and rationality of administrative decision-making and to enhance 
its legitimacy.”  
As mentioned in Chapter 2, currently taxpayers are not provided with any notice when (i) the SARS has 
received a request to exchange their confidential information (in the context of EoIR), (ii) a decision is 
taken by SARS to adhere to the request and share the requested (or other) information, nor (iii) are 
taxpayers informed once the information has been shared. Taxpayers are also not afforded the 
opportunity to make any representations during any stage of the decision making process or to otherwise 
participate in the EoI process, for example, to verify, update, or correct information that will be 
exchanged. 
The current practice of the SARS in the EoI process therefore does not comply with the provisions of 
section 3(2) of the PAJA in all material aspects. 
It therefore remains to be asked whether the current SARS practice is ‘fair and justifiable’ for purposes of 
the carve-out under section 3(4) or (5) of the PAJA? 
                                                             




Section 3(5) allows for the use of other procedures (mandated by another empowering provision) 
provided that said procedures are still ‘fair’. 
Section 3(4) of the PAJA lists factors that must be taken into account when determining whether the 
departure from the section 3(2) notice procedure can be justified. The factors include (but are not limited 
to): 
“i. the objects of the empowering provision; 
ii. the nature and purpose of, and the need to take, the administrative action; 
iii. the likely effect of the administrative action; 
iv. the urgency of taking the administrative action or the urgency of the matter; and 
v. the need to promote an efficient administration and good governance.” 
This requirement for the alternative procedures to be ‘fair and justifiable’ can be read in the context of 
section 33 of the Constitution, which calls for administrative action that is ‘lawful, reasonable and 
procedurally fair’. The wording of section 33 of the Constitution echoes section 36’s requirement for any 
limitation of a fundamental right to be ‘reasonable and justifiable’. It would be hard to imagine an 
instance where administrative action that is not ‘fair and justifiable’, will be deemed to clear the 
‘reasonable and justifiable’ requirement of the general limitation clause. It is therefore not surprising to 
note the similarities between the factors mentioned above (section 3(4) of PAJA), and those listed in 
section 36 of the Constitution. 
On the basis that the cross-border exchange of taxpayer information is ‘administrative action’, the 
question arises whether the SARS’ practice is reasonable and justifiable, in the context of administrative 
justice, as far as it deviates from the ‘standard’ PAJA section 3(2) notice process. 
5.2.2.1 The reasonableness and justifiability of current SARS practice in the EoI process 
Firstly, in answer to the issue under this heading, it should be considered what the purpose of the 
administrative action by the SARS is. 
It would not be sufficient to state that the purpose of sharing the taxpayer information is to comply with 
tax treaty obligations.  
Using the preamble of most of South Africa’s double tax treaties as guide, the purpose of information 
exchange could be to aid in the avoidance of double taxation and prevention of fiscal evasion. Information 
is exchanged under TIEAs in order to assist in the administration and enforcement of the contracting 




Secondly, it must be considered whether there is a causal link between the administrative action, and the 
purpose it aims to achieve.128 
To this question some might answer that it is reasonable not to provide the taxpayer with upfront notice 
of the exchange given that this may effectively ‘tip off’ tax evaders.129 In other words, notice of an 
impending exchange may provide potential evaders with the opportunity to appeal the process as a 
delaying tactic in order to afford them time to transfer the assets in question to another jurisdiction or 
destroy incriminating evidence. 130 Proponents of this argument might point to other instances in South 
African law where the SARS is permitted to act without providing the taxpayer with prior notice or the 
opportunity to make representations. Instances such as this include cases where the Commissioner is 
entitled to appoint an agent to collect a tax debt due. See for example the judgement delivered in the 
Contract Support Services case: 131 
“I agree with the submission made … that not all administrative acts require the application of the 
audi alteram partem rule before they are given effect to… Where prior notice and a hearing would 
render the proposed act nugatory, no such prior notice or hearing is required.” 
Similarly, when conducting search and seizure procedures under Part D of the TAA, the SARS is also not 
required to provide the taxpayer with prior notice. Importantly, however, before conducting the raid, the 
SARS must apply (ex parte) to a judge for a warrant to authorise the action. This is common practice 
internationally, and is accepted as reasonable and fair administrative action under the circumstances 
(given that providing the particular taxpayer with prior notice would defeat the purpose of the exercise). 
There are, however, a number of shortcomings in this type of reasoning in the context of EoI. 
It is a fundamental principle of administrative justice that the fairness of the administrative procedure 
will depend on the circumstances of each case.  Fair procedural action by its nature requires the decision 
maker to apply their mind to the circumstances of each case, which reduces the scope for generalisation. 
As a result, broadly speaking, the SARS would therefore not be justified in assuming that each taxpayer 
whose information is to be exchanged is likely to be a tax evader who will abuse any notification 
procedure in order to undermine an investigation into his or her tax affairs.  It is submitted that the 
failure by SARS to comply with section 3(2) of the PAJA in all instances of information exchange will 
result in a presumption of guilt to tax evasion that cannot be justified.  It is inconceivable that the SARS 
would be able to procure evidence to substantiate such a blanket claim. 
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It is worth noting that in a purely domestic scenario, when conducting an investigation into the affairs of a 
taxpayer (in the context of an audit), the SARS must, under normal circumstances, notify the taxpayer of 
the impending administrative action and must provide the taxpayer with status reports throughout the 
process. 132  
It is anomalous that the protection afforded to taxpayers in the context of a purely domestic investigation 
should differ so completely from that currently afforded to taxpayers, in practice, during the SARS’ 
participation in EoI. Objectively, the ‘tip off’ risk is the same in both a domestic and international scenario 
(as assets may be dissipated in both instances).  
Moreover, in both search and seizure procedures and the appointment of an agent to collect tax debts 
there are remedies available to the taxpayer should they believe that the administrative action taken was 
not fair (beyond the fact that notice was not provided). As expanded upon later in this section, such 
remedies might prove difficult to access in practice in the context of EoI. The fact that an application must 
first be brought before a judge before a search and seizure procedure is conducted also offers the 
taxpayer some form of protection that is currently absent in the EoI process in South Africa. 
Having said this, however, the need for an effective administration must be borne in mind. Section 
33(3)(c) of the Constitution requires legislation to be effected to promote efficient administration, which 
is why the fourth factor under section (3)(4) of the PAJA, namely the ‘need to promote efficient 
administration and good governance’, must be considered. 
It could be argued that the notification process would place an unfair administrative burden on the SARS. 
For this argument to be successful, it would have to be shown that the detrimental impact on the ability to 
effectively administer the law is disproportionate to the harm done to the taxpayer under an alternative. 
The conflicting interests between the efficiency of the administration versus the protection of the 
taxpayer’s rights will boil down to the fundamental question of proportionality. 
Hoexter comments in this regard as follows: 133 
“Efficiency is, of course, an attractive and worthy goal because it promotes the speedy and cost-
effective delivery of goods and services; but one must be wary of placing too much emphasis on it or 
treating it as an end in itself. There is always the possibility that speed and cost-effectiveness will be 
valued above correctness, producing the consequent danger of elevation of the means (efficiency) 
over ends (legislative goals).” 
In terms of the affected person’s rights following the taking of a decision, section 5 of the PAJA deals with 
the taxpayer’s right to request written reasons from the administrators for the administrative action. 
                                                             
132 TAA chapter 5. 




Section 6 deals with the judicial review of administrative action. Both these sections will be of relevance 
after the fact – i.e. after the decision has been made and the taxpayer’s rights have already been affected. 
Section 5 would arguably allow taxpayers to request reasons from SARS for the decision to share their 
information with the other contracting State’s competent authority. If they were not made aware of the 
decision to begin with and are therefore not aware of it having happened, however, it would be practically 
impossible to call on this provision. Furthermore, informing the taxpayer of the decision to share their 
information after the fact seems to be little more than closing the stable door after the horse has bolted.  
This is also true, it is submitted, for the purposes of section 6’s judicial review. Once the information is 
shared – the damage is done, so to speak. The information could not practically be ‘unshared’. Where a 
judicial review or appeal reveals that there was a defect in SARS’ decision to share the information (either 
in the fairness or rationality of the procedures followed in making the decision itself, or in the accuracy of 
the information shared), this could form the basis of an application in the foreign jurisdiction for this 
information to be disregarded. The success of such an application is, however, by no means guaranteed.134  
The provisions of section 5 and 6 of the PAJA might provide the taxpayer with some relief. For example, 
where the information was illegally shared, the review process might pave the way for a claim for 
damages suffered. In practice, however, the risk remains that the taxpayer will be left bearing the 
consequences of unjust information exchange (without any real, practical remedy).  
The Aloe Vera case135 in the US is a good illustration of the injustice occasioned by unjust information 
exchange.  
In the Aloe Vera case, the plaintiff, Aloe Vera of America Inc, sued the US government for USD 52 million 
following the leak of sensitive taxpayer information to the Japanese press. The information, shared as part 
of a dual tax investigation undertaken by the US and Japanese revenue authorities, was furthermore 
shown to have been inaccurate. The taxpayer was not given prior notification of the exchange, nor were 
they given the opportunity to make any representations during the process to dispute and correct the 
accuracy of the information. The court found in favour of the plaintiff, after determining that the US 
government shared information they knew to be inaccurate. The amount awarded, however, was a mere 
USD 1,000 in statutory damages, after the plaintiff failed to prove causality, i.e. that actual damage was 
incurred as a result of the unlawful EoI. 
In South Africa there has been at least one instance where a taxpayer’s information was shared with the 
competent authority of the wrong country. 136 The taxpayer was not notified of the SARS’ proposed 
decision and was not allowed to make any representations in order to ensure that the information was 
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correct, and shared with the correct country.  Naturally, this caused difficulties for the taxpayer who then 
had to explain their affairs and position to the receiving State. 
Internationally, there is no consensus as to what practical protection should be afforded to taxpayers 
during the exchange process. Some countries, such as South Africa, provide taxpayers with no notice 
whatsoever (either before, or after the exchange), whereas other countries, such as Germany, Ireland and 
Liechtenstein, require that the taxpayer must be notified prior to the exchange. 137 
Proposed ‘best practice’ in this regard, as put forward by Baker and Pistone, 138 would be for both the 
supplying and receiving State to inform the taxpayer when EoI request is generated or received – with 
this right to notification being waived only when a reasoned request to do so is made by the receiving 
State in instances where the notification would prejudice the investigation. 
It is therefore submitted that on the basis that EoI amounts to ‘administrative action’ subject to the PAJA, 
the taxpayer’s right to procedural fairness can only be realised if the SARS principally adheres to the 
protection offered by section 3(2).  As is evident of the discussion above, specific legislation may be 
required to regulate the circumstances under which SARS may deviate from the obligations under section 
3(2), such as when a real risk exists that the investigation process may be prejudiced. As mentioned, 
precedent already exists in the parallel domestic scenario where an ex parte application must be brought 
before a High Court judge. 
Moreover, as emphasised in Chapter 4 of this paper (in the context of the POPI Act’s notification 
requirements), informing the taxpayer of the impending exchange and affording them the opportunity to 
correct any inaccurate information would improve the quality of the information shared and contribute 
to the efficacy of the process.  
5.2.2.1.1 The reasonableness of the limitation, with specific reference to EoIR 
Internationally, there have been questions raised surrounding the efficacy of EoIR in meeting its core 
objectives. Studies performed on the effectiveness of TIEAs (which only allow for exchange upon request) 
have indicated that they have little effect on the behaviour of tax evaders. 139 Many commentators have 
pointed out that there appears to be a lack of evidence to support the view that exchange of taxpayer 
information has had a meaningful impact on assisting in curbing tax evasion. 140 
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The doubt cast over the efficacy of EoIR in meeting the objective it was designed to achieve will raise 
questions as to whether the limitation of the taxpayer’s rights can be justified (in the context of section 36 
of the Constitution).  
It must be noted however, that it has also been argued that the protection currently afforded to taxpayers, 
in combination with the other provisions currently in place surrounding EoIR (for example, the 
requirement that the information must be ‘necessary’ or ‘foreseeably relevant’ for the enforcement of the 
contracting States’ tax laws) is the root cause of the disappointing results achieved thus far.141  
5.2.2.1.2 The reasonableness of the limitation, with specific reference to EoIA 
Some have argued that the obligation to notify the taxpayer prior to the exchange is of greater relevance 
under EoIR given that the issue of data security takes precedent in the context of EoIA. 142 This argument 
is based on the sheer volume of information being processed and large number taxpayers affected as part 
of the EoIA process making it impractical to notify each taxpayer individually. 143  As mentioned earlier, 
care should be exercised not to over emphasise efficiency considerations when fundamental rights are at 
issue. 
As stated in Chapter 4 in the context of the notification requirements contained in the POPI Act, this 
argument might be challenged in South Africa, where it is the norm for financial institutions to 
automatically notify accountholders via text message or email should any transaction be processed on 
their accounts. It should be possible to use this same, existing technology to notify the taxpayer of the 
impending exchange of their private information. 
In the context of EoIA, it should also be considered whether the PAJA would impose any obligations on 
the financial institutions as well. The PAJA applies not only to administrative action carried out by organs 
of State, such as the SARS, but also by other persons “exercising a public power or performing a public 
function”. 144 It should therefore be considered whether the financial institutions are also exercising a 
public power or performing a public function when participating in the EoIA process. This analysis is, 
however, beyond the scope if this paper. 
5.3 Summary remarks 
As required by section 33 of the Constitution, the PAJA was enacted to give effect to the fundamental right 
to just administrative action.  
The ‘standard procedure’ prescribed by the Act would include the prior notification of the person whose 
rights are affected by the administrative action and affording them the opportunity to make 
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representations. Any deviation from this standard will only be considered lawful where it is shown to be 
just and fair under the circumstances.  
The analysis performed in this chapter has shown that EoI falls within the scope of the PAJA because it 
meets the Act’s definition of ‘administrative action’. The SARS’ processes and safeguards surrounding the 
EoI process would therefore need to comply with those prescribed by the Act. This is, however, not the 
case at present.  
The detailed reasons supporting the aforementioned conclusion are as follows: 
A key question in determining whether EoI would meet all the criterion of the PAJA definition is whether 
the ‘decision’ to share the information has a direct, external, legal effect on the taxpayer’s rights.  
The meaning of the term, ‘decision’, under the PAJA includes both the making of an administrative 
decision, as well as the failure to make such a decision. In applying this definition to EoI, it is necessary to 
differentiate between EoIA and EoIR. 
Under EoIA, the exchange process is so rigidly automated that the procedures carried out by the SARS can 
be argued to be devoid of any real evaluative process. In other words, the relevant SARS official, as the 
‘decision maker’, does not critically evaluate the information before them for accuracy, or foreseeable 
relevance, before executing the bulk exchange. The SARS’ therefore fails to make a decision during the 
EoIA process. 
This can be distinguished from EoIR. Under EoIR, the very nature of the mechanism requires a more 
determinative process on the part of the SARS, with the process and procedures undertaken by the SARS 
being comparable to those undertaken as part of a domestic tax audit. Here, the SARS does make an 
administrative decision when complying with a request to share taxpayer information. 
Both EoIR and EoIA therefore amount to a PAJA ‘decision’.  
As to the so-called ‘ripeness criterion’ (i.e. whether the rights of the taxpayer have been affected with 
direct external legal effect), the South African courts have been clear in providing guidance as to how this 
requirement should be interpreted. In the Digital case, 145 the SCA’s approach to making this 
determination is to not merely include actions where prejudice has already occurred, but also instances 
where prejudice is inevitable (regardless of whether the action is complete or not). In the context of EoI, 
where the taxpayer’s right to privacy will necessarily be restricted (see Chapter 4), the meaning of ‘direct, 
external legal affect’ is broad enough to encompass the ‘decision’ (as defined by PAJA) to exchange 
taxpayer information. 
                                                             





On this basis, the SARS has a legal obligation to comply with the provisions of the PAJA during the EoI 
process. Specifically, the SARS has a duty to comply with the notification procedures prescribed by the 
Act.  
The SARS’ current practice of universally denying taxpayers the right to notification is at odds with this 
obligation, and, it is submitted, cannot be argued to be to be fair and justifiable.  
It is a fundamental principle of administrative justice that the fairness of the administrative procedure 
will depend on the circumstances of each case. 
Given that the circumstances of each taxpayer, and therefore also circumstances surrounding each 
exchange will be different, the blanket denial of the right to be notified in every instance, without 
exception, cannot be justified. 
It is submitted that the prior notification of the taxpayer should be the rule in the EoI process (both EoIR 
and EoIA). Any restriction of this notification process being the exception, made only when the specific 
circumstances of that exchange justifies the departure from this norm (for example, when a real risk 
exists that notifying the relevant taxpayer would prejudice that particular investigation).   
To realise this in practice, it is recommended that legislation be enacted to regulate the circumstances 
under which the SARS may deviate from the ‘standard’ PAJA notification obligations (as set out in section 
3(2) of the Act). In this respect, precedent already exists in the parallel domestic scenario where an ex 








CHAPTER 6: OVERALL SUMMARY REMARKS AND CONCLUSION  
This minor dissertation identifies and analyses the constitutional considerations raised by the current 
protection afforded to taxpayers in South Africa during the EoI process. The analysis deals with both EoIA 
and EoIR, and is done with specific reference to the taxpayer’s fundamental rights to privacy and just 
administrative action. Due recognition is given to the lawful limitation of these rights, as provided for in 
section 36 of the Constitution. 
Currently in South Africa, taxpayers are not afforded the opportunity to participate in the EoI process. 
Taxpayers are not informed of the impending exchange of their private information, are not afforded the 
opportunity to review the information prior to the transfer, object to the exchange, or make any 
representations during the process. The affected taxpayer is also not informed of the exchange having 
taken place after the fact.  
This paper by no means objects to the desirability or validity of the pursuit of effective tax administration. 
It is furthermore accepted that in the era of globalization and international mobility, achieving this 
purpose would require the cooperation of tax administrations across national borders. One such 
mechanism of cooperation being the exchange of taxpayer information between competent authorities. 
Having said this, however, the research performed resulted in the identification of certain critical 
shortcomings in the current legal protection enjoyed by taxpayers in South Africa during the EoI process.  
Specifically, the analysis identifies two fundamental deficiencies in the current EoI framework in South 
Africa, namely: inadequate measures to ensure that the confidentiality of taxpayer information is 
maintained during the exchange process; and the indiscriminate and categorical denial of the taxpayer’s 
right to be notified of an exchange. These deficiencies are compounded by the limited remedies available 
to the taxpayer, in practice, once the information has been passed to a foreign State. 
These shortcomings in the protection afforded to taxpayers arise as a result of a combination of factors, 
including deficiencies in legislation that does not adequately circumscribe the discretionary powers of the 
SARS, as well as a lack on the part of the SARS to adhere to those safeguards already provided for in South 
African law. 
The extent of the resultant curtailment of the taxpayer’s fundamental right to privacy and just 
administrative action profoundly erodes the proportionality and rationality of the limitation when 
weighed against the purpose it aims to achieve, namely the enforcement of tax laws.   
Doubts surrounding the proportionality of the violation of the taxpayer’s rights become particularly 
apparent in the context of EoIA, where the information exchange is triggered by a set of broad 
presumptive criteria (without any critical evaluation of the circumstances of each taxpayer affected). 
Given the number of taxpayers caught in the EoIA net, the rational link between the means of the process, 




In light of the conclusions reached by the analysis performed for this dissertation, the following 
recommendations are proposed to address the various shortcomings identified: 
 Legislation should be developed to circumscribe the discretionary powers afforded to the SARS in 
determining the circumstances and manner in which taxpayer information may be exchanged.  
 In the context of safeguarding the confidentiality of the taxpayer’s private information: 
o section 108(5) of the ITA, which permits the SARS to deviate from the standard 
confidentiality safeguards which would apply in a purely domestic context, should be 
amended to take into account the coming into effect of the 1996 Constitution; and 
o legislation, such as the POPI Act, must be given effect to ensure that before exchanging 
information with the other State, the SARS must ensure that the secrecy provisions in place 
in said State are similar to those enforced domestically (as is already provided for in the 
context of EoIA in the OECD Standard). 
 In terms of the taxpayer’s right to be notified, the SARS should adhere to the fundamental principles 
of administrative justice, as given effect to by the provisions of the PAJA. Accordingly, the SARS 
should, as standard practice, provide the taxpayer with prior notice of the pending exchange. The 
affected taxpayer should also be afforded the opportunity to make representations during the 
process, and request written reasons from the SARS for the administrative action taken. Any 
deviation from this standard should be done only in exceptional cases where a critical evaluation of 
the circumstances surrounding that particular taxpayer reveals compelling reasons to do so. To this 
effect, it is recommended that legislation be put in place to provide guidance as to under which 
circumstances such a deviation would be justified.  
This minor dissertation furthermore highlights that South Africa is not unique in facing the challenges 
and shortcomings set out above. With the drive towards greater transparency being driven on an 
international stage by the G20, many other countries have also been left grappling with the same 
questions. 
In this international context, Baker and Groenhagen rightly point out that: 146  
“…as more information is exchanged between revenue authorities, it is increasingly anomalous that 
the taxpayer has no way of protecting the rights guaranteed in the instruments under which the 
information is exchanged.”  
This sentiment is echoed by commentators such as Pistone, who, along with Baker, have recently raised 
concerns regarding the one-sidedness of current developments in the EoI arena in favour of efficient 
administration – with little being done to ensure that the taxpayers’ rights are adequately safeguarded.147  
In this regard, on the occasion of the 2015 Congress of the International Fiscal Association (‘IFA’), it was 
announced that a monitoring group will be established within IFA. This Monitoring Group will measure 
                                                             
146 Baker and Groenhagen, p. 22. 




the effective protection of taxpayer rights across participating States (including South Africa) against 
certain identified minimum standards identified by Baker and Pistone in their General Report to the 
Congress. 
As the work of the Monitoring Group progresses, one would hope that South Africa’s enthusiasm for 
remaining at the forefront of international developments in tax law and administration extends to 
advances in the practical protection of taxpayers’ rights.  
The fervent efforts of the SARS to carry out its mandate as the nation’s tax collector in the fullest and most 
efficient manner possible is indeed admirable, if not indispensable to the country as a whole. In doing so, 
however, the SARS must give effect to the rights of the taxpayer as enshrined in the Constitution of South 
Africa. In the context of EoI, this dissertation concludes that the taxpayer’s fundamental rights to privacy 
and just administrative action cannot simply be sacrificed on the altar of administrative ease and 
efficiency, as it appears to currently be the case in practice. Where needed, legislation must be amended 
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